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Liberalizing International Trade in Services: 
Challenges and Opportunities for Developing Countries 
  by Matthias Lücke and Dean Spinanger 
CONTENTS 
  Several developments in international trade 
in services impact strongly on developing 
countries: First, the world-wide diffusion of 
information technologies (IT) has created 
new export opportunities for developing 
countries in IT services. Second, the recent-
ly proclaimed Millennium Development 
Goals for poverty reduction can only be at-
tained if key services are provided more effi-
ciently in developing countries—particularly 
through the liberalization of service imports. 
Third, in the ongoing Doha Development 
Round (DR) of trade negotiations, develop-
ing countries are asked to formally commit 
to liberalizing their service imports under the 
terms of the General Agreement on Trade in 
Services (GATS).  
  Developing countries will benefit from libera-
lizing service imports if liberalization enhan-
ces competition on the supply side. This is 
typically the case for producer services, 
such as domestic and international trans-
port, financial services, and telecommunica-
tions. The lifting of restrictions on the market 
access by foreigners (including through di-
rect investment) will often improve service 
quality or lower prices and thereby enhance 
the international competitiveness of down-
stream industries. In Doha Development 
Round negotiations, therefore, developing 
countries may find it useful to commit to libe-
ralizing imports of producer services. 
  By contrast, the benefits of import liberaliza-
tion are less clear for some consumer servi-
ces where supply is subject to network mo-
nopolies (e.g., water and energy distribution) 
or demand is constrained by poverty (health 
care, education). Here, achieving a socially 
optimal level of supply may require carefully 
calibrated government policies, possibly with 
international donor support. For developing 
countries, such sectors should not be priority 
areas for commitments on service imports 
under the GATS.  
  Most service exports by developing coun-
tries, especially IT services transmitted elec-
tronically, face few import barriers in indus-
trialized countries. However, under the 
GATS, service exports may also be deliv-
ered through temporary movement of natu-
ral persons, e.g., developing country nation-
als working in industrialized countries with-
out becoming residents there. If Doha De-
velopment Round negotiations were to in-
crease opportunities for such temporary la-
bor migration, the benefits to developing 
countries could be huge.                                                                   
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While some services, such as international transport and tourism, have been traded internationally 
without much fanfare for many decades, several recent developments have raised new concerns about 
how international trade in services impacts on developing countries. First, technological progress in 
information technology (IT) has sharply reduced the cost of the international transmission of informa-
tion and has thereby rendered a large number of IT-related services internationally tradable. A few de-
veloping countries, most notably India, have benefited from this progress as their IT-related service 
exports increased markedly over the last decade. This raises the question of whether, and how, this 
pattern could be repeated elsewhere.  
Second, the renewed focus on poverty reduction in international aid policy, epitomized by the Mil-
lenium Development Goals, has drawn attention to the role of those service sectors (e.g., water, elec-
tricity, health care, and telecommunications) that are crucial for improving living standards and for in-
creasing the competitiveness of export industries in developing countries. Frequently these services 
used to be provided (if at all) by loss-making state enterprises at less than satisfactory quality. With 
support especially from the World Bank and other development banks, many developing countries 
have embarked on sectoral reforms that have frequently involved foreign investors when privatizing 
service suppliers and the setting-up of new regulatory bodies. The mixed outcomes of such reforms 
raise the question of what lessons should be learned from the experience and how policies for service 
sector liberalization and reductions in import barriers should be designed in the future. 
Third, with the conclusion of the Uruguay Round of trade negotiations in April, 1994, the liberali-
zation of service imports became institutionalized in the world trading system. While the Uruguay 
Round succeded mostly in establishing a conceptual and institutional framework for service sector ne-
gotiations, with little actual liberalization induced by the round itself (Table 1.1), analytical work since 
the late 1990s has demonstrated the large potential benefits of liberalizing market access for foreign 
service suppliers, especially in business services. This raises the question of how developing countries 
should position themselves in the ongoing Doha Round talks on services if and when these proceed to 
the stage of serious negotiations. 
Table 1.1: 
Overview of Computable General Equilibrium Assessments of the Uruguay Rounda: Distribution of Welfare 
Effects by Specified Disaggregation (Percent) 
Studyb Modelc Agriculture Primary  MFA  Manufact. Services  Tariffs 
  1.        5   14    81 
 2.    Id    68   15  18    
   IIe    38   12  49    
   IIIf    61   17  23    
 3.    Ig   9  3  35  53     
   IIh   3  6  61  30     
   IIIh  3  7  50  39     
 4.    Ig    31   39    30 
   IIh    10   64    26 
  5.    I    46   29    24 
    II    26   37    37 
  6.        34   40  14  12 
aDrawn from Francois et al. (1996, Table 1, last column); please see original for specifics. — bStudy: 1 = Hertel et al. 
(1995); 2 = Harrison et al. (1995); 3 = Francois et al. (1995); 4 = Francois et al. (1994); 5 = Yang (1994); 6 = Nguyen et al. 
(1993). — cThe Roman numerals designate model runs carried out under differing assumptions; the reader is advised to refer 
to the original tables in the articles to examine in depth the structure and the underlying assumptions.  —  dStatic. — 
eDynamic. — fStatic; not perfect competition (PC). — gSteady state. — hSteady state, no PC. 4 
These three core questions, while broadly interconnected, relate to analytically separate issues—
technological, economic, institutional, and political; service imports vs. exports (each under different 
modes of supply); multilateral, bilateral and unilateral policies. These diverse analytical issues reflect 
the fact that services constitute a large, heterogeneous sector and that priority policy concerns are 
therefore highly subsector- and country-specific. At the same time, there are overriding basic factors 
which shape the efficiency of service sector liberalization and thus will need to be taken into consid-
eration. 
This report provides a broad overview of the key policy issues faced by developing countries and 
suggests how national governments and other actors may proceed to resolve them. Since developing 
countries constitute a broad and diverse group, the issues emphasized by this report—related broadly 
to low per capita income or to limited administrative capacity—affect individual developing countries 
to different degrees, depending on their size and level of economic development. The discussion is 
structured around the concerns raised by WTO negotiations on services; nevertheless, the main con-
clusions regarding service sector reform and import liberalization apply irrespective of how the current 
impasse in Doha Round negotiations is resolved.  
Following this introduction and executive summary, Chapter 2 deals with several institutional and 
policy issues raised by the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS). First, some provisions in 
the GATS are unclear and lead to uncertainty with respect to the interpretation of commitments, such 
as the definition of public services, which are not covered by the GATS (Art. I(3)). We suggest that 
developing country negotiatiors should always assume the widest possible reading of these provisions 
and specify their commitments and exemptions accordingly.  
Second, it has been suggested that, rather than having to go through complex multilateral negotia-
tions under the GATS, developing countries would be better off if they liberalize service imports uni-
laterally. We point out that developing countries will indeed be the greatest beneficiaries of liberaliz-
ing their own imports; hence unilateral liberalization would be entirely appropriate. At the same time, 
political economy arguments suggest that some reforms might not be politically feasible when under-
taken unilaterally because of opposition from interest groups; however, when the same reforms are 
part of a package of multilateral liberalization that also benefits the country’s potentially new export-
ers, then the interest groups supporting liberalization would be strengthened and liberalization might 
become politically feasible. 
Third, it has been asked how developing countries will fare under the proposed request-offer format 
for service negotiations, given its emphasis on bilateral negotiations in which developing country ne-
gotiators would frequently face their counterparts from much larger trading partners. We argue that 
while the request-offer approach has its drawbacks, it is difficult to conceive of a different format for 
negotiations that would adequately correspond to the complexity of the task. However, we suggest that 
developing countries should aim to negotiate jointly with countries with which they share a common 
trade policy agenda; furthermore, during an advanced stage of negotiations, there may be room for ne-
gotiating formula-type approaches to liberalization so that commitments would be easier to compare 
across countries.  
Chapter 3 takes up the debate on how, and by whom, international trade in services should be as-
sessed with reference to the objectives of the GATS and particularly the role of developing countries. 
We argue that the broad mandate of GATS Art. XIX(3) provides no useful operational guidance. What 
is needed, rather, are highly country- and sector-specific assessments that can inform decision-makers 
on countries’ negotiating positions. Such analyses will involve a wide range of contributors from gov-
ernments, civil society, academia, and international organizations. There is no need for a grand, “once-
and-for-all” assessment by the Council for Trade in Services on which all members would have to 
agree. Governments will naturally tend to draw different conclusions from whatever empirical evi-
dence they are presented with; appropriately, the GATS leaves its individual members considerable 
freedom to decide how far they wish to push import liberalization.  5 
Chapter 4 looks briefly at the impact of service sector liberalization since the end of the Uruguay 
Round and notes that it received but little attention early on, largely because little actual liberalization 
was achieved at the time. Methodological papers on the measurement of trade barriers have shown in-
creasing sophistication in recent years. While the data requirements for the more involved approaches 
are considerable, their results do allow for a better understanding of the fine points of the liberalization 
process. Based on a fairly wide range of methodologies and sectors studied, it seems clear that import 
barriers for services are typically higher than for goods, and also higher in developing than in high-in-
come countries. This implies, of course, that developing countries have more to gain from service 
sector liberalization. And where they need to invest their efforts is accordingly examined, and an ap-
proach to be used for investigating specific countries and sectors is suggested.  
Chapter 5 reviews empirical studies on income and welfare gains from a prospective liberalization 
of service imports, either comprehensive or sectoral. The income estimates for comprehensive liberali-
zation based on computable general equilibrium (CGE) simulation models are typically larger than for 
eliminating the relatively few remaining barriers for goods trade, but are not spectacularly large (typi-
cally, around 2 percent of GDP for a developing country with significant initial import barriers in ser-
vices). The gains tend to be much higher when additional inflows of foreign direct investment (FDI) 
are included in the simulations. Sector studies confirm that restructuring and import liberalization tend 
to improve sector performance and tend to be associated with higher GDP growth overall. Overall, 
however, the potential benefits from import liberalization are highly country-specific so that sectoral 
priorities for liberalization need to be established on a country-by-country basis.  
Chapter 6 is a case study on financial sector reform, focusing on the impact of liberalizing market 
entry by foreign banks. We emphasize that foreign bank entry does not necessarily entail capital ac-
count liberalization, which is not covered by the GATS and whose costs and benefits may not be 
straightforward for many developing countries. An extensive literature demonstrates that, in a wide 
variety of countries, foreign bank entry had a positive impact on (i) competition and efficiency in 
banking; (ii) banking sector stability; and (iii) the allocation of credit across sectors of the economy. 
Looking at individual country experiences, we use the case of Vietnam to illustrate the issues raised by 
allowing foreign bank entry (under the U.S.-Vietnamese Bilateral Trade Agreement) when the banking 
system is weak and suffers from severe financial repression. Drawing on the experiences of several 
other developing countries that liberalized their financial sectors from a similarly weak position, we 
conclude that Vietnam’s domestic banks should be able not only to survive more intense foreign com-
petition but may even be strengthened by it. We also note that a positive outcome depends on com-
plementary reforms introducing prudential regulations and banking supervision and of dealing with the 
large stock of nonperforming bank loans of state enterprises. 
In Chapter 7, we turn to the prospects for developing countries service exports. We focus on Modes 
1 and 2 (cross-border supply and consumption abroad) and Mode 4 (temporary presence of natural 
persons) because service-sector FDI originating in developing countries (Mode 3 exports) is still 
small. For all developing countries combined, Mode 1 and 2 exports have grown less rapidly than ex-
ports of goods since 1995. Studying the example of India, whose nontraditional service exports have 
increased impressively, we find several factors (including plenty of well-trained university graduates 
with good English and low wage expectations) that do not exist in many other developing countries 
and therefore make it unlikely that India’s success in IT-related service exports will be replicated 
elsewhere. 
Compared to all other trade flows, larger service exports under Mode 4 (temporary presence of 
natural persons) promise huge welfare gains to developing countries. Here, unfortunately, high-income 
countries maintain rather tough entry restrictions, motivated in large part by the likely adverse distri-
butional effects of all forms of immigration. While the GATS does not provide a blueprint for liberali-
zation in this area, even relatively small movements of workers would produce large welfare gains for 
the workers and their home countries.  6 
Chapter 8 draws together the policy implications from the analysis. With respect to ongoing service 
negotiations, developing countries should enter talks with a clear idea of which liberalization steps 
they wish to focus on. They should not be overly impressed by the requests for commitments by the 
EU Commission, which respresent a wish list more than anything else. With respect to implications 
for technical and other donor assistance, we argue that an enhanced policy dialog with developing 
country governments about service sector reform and import liberalization could be helpful to promote 
internal debate in developing countries. Closer to the implementation of reforms, grants and loans may 
be used to support comprehensive sectoral reform programs, including the establishment of appropri-
ate regulatory agencies. In particular, regulatory cooperation among developing countries may be en-
couraged at a bilateral or regional level as some countries may be too small to support full-fledged 
regulatory agencies on their own. Finally, export promotion may be justified economically if the cost 
of market entry is initially high but falls as exporters gain experience.  
2  Developing Countries in GATS Negotiations 
Not least because trade in services was only recently included in the multilateral trading system and 
little experience exists with the implementation of the GATS, various technical and procedural ques-
tions need to be answered satisfactorily to ensure that developing countries benefit from the liberaliza-
tion of trade in services. This section discusses three broad issues that have a bearing on the subse-
quent analysis of the benefits and costs of services liberalization in developing countries and the 
guidelines for effective regulation: the sectoral coverage of the GATS (Section 2.1); the relationship 
between unilateral import liberalization and multilateral liberalization under the GATS (Section 2.2); 
and the choice of negotiating procedures that enable developing countries to articulate their interests 
while they simultaneously benefit from special and differential treatment as appropriate (Section 2.3). 
2.1  The Scope of the GATS  
The broad scope of the GATS, combined with the complexity of many rules and the fact that commit-
ments, once made, are difficult to reverse, has raised concerns about the continuing ability of member 
countries to pursue public policy objectives through domestic regulations or by providing public ser-
vices (e.g., Woodroffe 2002).1 These concerns are particularly acute for developing countries with 
limited administrative capacity and financial means to pay for legal representation, for example, in the 
WTO’s Dispute Settlement Mechanism. The essence of these concerns is that, because of the rules’ 
complexity, sometimes unclear wording, and uncertain interpretation by future dispute settlement pan-
els, a commitment today may have unintended effects in the future or may tie the hands of future gov-
ernments in politically unacceptable ways. This section explains the concerns and discusses develop-
ing countries’ options for dealing with these issues. 
To put the concerns into perspective, it is helpful to recall how GATS members enter into commit-
ments regarding the application of GATS disciplines. In principle, such GATS disciplines as most-fa-
____________________ 
1 The procedure for withdrawing commitments is laid down in GATS Art. XXI. In essence, trading partners affected by the 
withdrawal may insist on compensatory adjustments in the member’s schedule; without their agreement or equivalent arbi-
tration, the commitment cannot be withdrawn. This makes the process cumbersome and unpredictable. For trade in services, 
this procedure has hardly been used so far. One current case is related to the eastern enlargement of the European Union; 
some new EU members are now obliged to adopt a less liberal import regime than they committed to when they joined the 
WTO. Hoda (2001: Chapter IV) discusses in detail the use of the equivalent procedure for trade in goods (Art. XXVIII of 
GATT (1994)) since 1948.  7 
vored nation (MFN) or national treatment or market access provisions may apply to any service sup-
plied commercially as well as to certain domestic regulations that could potentially act as trade barri-
ers. However, GATS members have wide latitude in subjecting or not subjecting their service sectors 
to those disciplines. While the general obligations (“horizontal commitments”) under Part II of the 
GATS (such as MFN treatment) apply to all commercially supplied services, members may neverthe-
less register exemptions from MFN treatment.2 Specific (“vertical”) commitments under Part III of the 
GATS, which include market access provisions and national treatment and have a much larger poten-
tial economic and policy impact, apply only to those service sectors to which each member explicitly 
subscribes (bottom-up or positive list approach). In principle, therefore, GATS members remain in full 
control of their policies, provided that they have registered all desired exemptions from general (hori-
zontal) obligations in their country schedules at the time of the Uruguay Round and ensure that their 
specific (vertical) commitments (Part III) fully cover their policy preferences. At the same time, the 
administrative hurdles for reversing a commitment under GATS Art. XXI are considerable (even if it 
was made inadvertently). 
The concern about WTO members’ ability to pursue public policy objectives stems from the com-
plex nature of certain GATS rules combined with some unclear legal language, including the defini-
tion of the services covered by the GATS (Art. I(3)) and the distinction between market access and 
domestic regulations (Low and Mattoo 2000).3 Art. I(3) defines the services covered by the GATS to 
include “any service in any sector except services supplied in the exercise of governmental authority,” 
where “ ‘a service supplied in the exercise of governmental authority’ means any service which is sup-
plied neither on a commercial basis, nor in competition with one or more service suppliers.” This defi-
nition lacks clarity and there is little guidance available on how future dispute settlement panels may 
interpret it (in particular, there is no relevant precedence). For example, negotiators may conceivably 
overlook the need to state clearly that certain commitments for broadly defined service sectors do not 
apply to ‘governmental’ subsectors, such as public broadcasting in the case of audiovisual services. It 
is worth noting, nevertheless, that the wording of Art. I(3) leaves it up to each WTO member to decide 
whether a particular service is to be supplied under governmental authority, and hence not covered by 
the GATS. In particular, ‘governmental’ status would not be affected by the fact that, elsewhere, the 
same service is supplied commercially or by competing suppliers. 
Similarly, the wording of the negotiating mandate of Art. VI(4) of the GATS regarding future disci-
plines on domestic regulations is somewhat vague, and the article is therefore quoted in full: “With a 
view to ensuring that measures relating to qualification requirements and procedures, technical stan-
dards and licensing requirements do not constitute unnecessary barriers to trade in services, the Coun-
cil for Trade in Services shall, through appropriate bodies it may establish, develop any necessary dis-
ciplines. Such disciplines shall aim to ensure that such requirements are, inter alia: (a) based on objec-
tive and transparent criteria, such as competence and the ability to supply the service; (b) not more 
burdensome than necessary to ensure the quality of the service; (c) in the case of licensing procedures, 
not in themselves a restriction on the supply of the service.” 
Thus future disciplines will need to spell out whether requirements (a), (b), and (c) should apply ir-
respective of whether a member has made specific commitment on a given sector, as a literal reading 
of Art. VI(4) suggests; or only in the presence of a specific commitment which, naturally, should not 
____________________ 
2 Exemptions from most-favored nation treatment are supposed to be temporary, but in practice do not carry an enforceable 
time limit (GATS Annex on Article II Exemptions). 
3 Unintended consequences of undertakings may be nontrivial, as the U.S.–EU dispute during the late 1990s over the EU’s 
proposed banana import regime demonstrates. The proposed import regime, whose main purpose was to protect small-scale 
Caribbean banana producers linked with the EU under the Lomé Convention, implicitly discriminated against U.S.-owned 
wholesalers in violation of MFN treatment and was therefore ruled illegal by successive dispute settlement panels. The fact 
that even the EU’s well-paid and well-trained negotiators had failed to notify an appropriate exemption during the Uruguay 
Round makes the negotiating tasks faced by small or poor developing countries with limited administrative capacity appear 
rather demanding. 8 
be undermined by domestic regulations, as logic suggests. So far, the Council for Trade in Services, 
through its Working Party on Domestic Regulation, has made little progress developing these disci-
plines; the only draft disciplines available that may convey a sense of possible outcomes are for the 
accountancy sector. These would only apply to those countries that have made specific commitments 
for the sector.4  
Regarding the positions for developing countries to take in future negotiations, this discussion sug-
gests the following: 
• Whenever feasible, negotiators should work toward clarifying unclear language in the GATS. 
Specifically, public services in line with Art. I(3) should be defined more operationally and pre-
cisely, and disciplines on domestic regulation (Art. VI(4)) should apply only if specific commit-
ments might otherwise be undermined. At an operational level, such clarifications can best be 
achieved through the Council for Trade in Services.5 
•  Regarding thefuture disciplines for domestic regulations (Art.  VI(4)), developing countries may 
want these to be kept as simple as possible, given limited administrative capacity. By contrast, in-
dustrial countries might seek rather detailed disciplines which would be easier to enforce, while 
being less concerned about administrative burdens.  
•  Negotiators should assume the widest possible reading of existing GATS rules and ensure that spe-
cific commitments are appropriately circumscribed.  
Donors can help developing countries deal with the complexity of the GATS by providing training 
for developing country negotiators and related expertise. 
2.2  Unilateral vs. Multilateral Liberalization of Developing Country Service Imports 
If a country decides to open domestic service sectors to foreign competition, it does not follow that the 
GATS is always the most useful framework to do so; liberalization could also be undertaken unilater-
ally or, in many instances, as part of the conditionality for World Bank or IMF structural adjustment 
loans. Thus the country would benefit from a more liberal import regime without the delays, adminis-
trative cost, and potential risks involved in working through the GATS. Unilateral liberalization with-
out commitments that are difficult to reverse may appear especially attractive to small or poor devel-
oping countries with limited administrative capacity, or when the technology of service supply is still 
evolving or best practices for regulation have not been firmly established. Against this background, 
this section discusses the pros and cons of developing countries actively engaging in the GATS proc-
ess. 
In principle, the rationale for a multilateral agreement on the liberalization of trade in services is the 
same as for trade in goods (Krugman 1997; OECD 2002). Unfortunately, this rationale can be ob-
scured by the mercantilist language often used in international trade negotiations, which assumes im-
plicitly that exports are desirable whereas imports are undesirable. Accordingly, a country offers “con-
cessions” in the form of reduced import barriers (leading to higher imports), in return for reductions in 
import barriers by its trading partners (leading to higher exports). This language is grossly misleading 
because empirical studies show consistently that the benefits of trade liberalization accrue first and 
foremost to the liberalizing country itself: through lower prices, more varieties of consumer goods or 
services or industrial inputs, and more efficient resource use. While exporters also benefit by being 
____________________ 
4 Draft guidelines may be accessed through: http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/serv_e/accountancy_e/accountancy_e.htm 
5 Technically, the General Council rather than the Council for Trade in Services conducts the functions of the Ministerial 
Conference in between its meetings (Art. IV, WTO Agreement) and is therefore responsible for interpreting the agreements 
(Art. IX(2), WTO Agreement). However, the General Council will normally follow a recommendation by the Council for 
Trade in Services as the membership of the two bodies is identical. 9 
able to specialize more intensively according to their comparative advantages, their income gains are 
typically smaller than those of the import-liberalizing country.  
Why then should developing countries not just liberalize unilaterally? Essentially, because unilat-
eral liberalization may not be politically feasible. Existing protection provides benefits to small, well-
organized groups (the producers of the protected goods or services), while liberalization would pro-
vide larger total benefits to much larger, less well organized groups (e.g., consumers or industrial 
customers). For each member of those large groups, the cost of protection is too small to spend suffi-
cient resources on opposing it.6 
Multilateral negotiations offer a way out of this dilemma by producing a package of measures that 
include improved market access for each country’s exporters. Hence the protection lobbies now face 
more focused opposition by exporters, and the full package of welfare-improving liberalization meas-
ures may now become politically feasible. An economically sound justification of multilateral trade 
agreements, including for service imports, may thus be based on the political economy of trade pro-
tection, rather than on the benefits and costs of trade liberalization to the economy and society (which 
could, in principle, be obtained through unilateral instead of multilateral liberalization).  
This logic also helps understand the extension of the multilateral trading system during the Uruguay 
Round in the mid-1990s from trade in goods (GATT 1947) to include services (GATS) and trade-re-
lated intellectual property rights (TRIPS). Further liberalization of trade in goods, which would benefit 
developing country exporters, involved politically difficult steps for high-income countries, such as 
bringing agriculture and textiles back into the mainstream of the multilateral trading order. By includ-
ing services and TRIPS in the WTO system, it was possible for high-income country governments to 
gain the support of key export interests, especially in the United States, and ultimately implement the 
whole Uruguay Round package. In this sense, the GATS is a response to the growing tradability of 
services and their increasing share in global value added. Without liberalization that benefits service 
exporters in high-income countries (as well as, of course, service importers), it may no longer be pos-
sible to draw up a package of measures that would be politically acceptable to high-income country 
governments.7 
Another motivation for liberalizing service imports in a multilateral framework, for example by 
making appropriate specific commitments, may lie in the enhanced credibility afforded by specific 
commitments under the GATS. Since such commitments are more costly and difficult to reverse than 
mere national legislation, policy reversals may be perceived as becoming less likely. In the particular 
case of service imports, however, developing countries may have alternative commitment devices 
available in the form of conditionality under loans from international financial institutions (IFIs). In 
particular, service sector reforms are often facilitated by project loans from the development banks, in 
which case appropriate sectoral policies, including guarantees for foreign direct investors, are typically 
part of the loans’ conditionality.  
What does this discussion imply for developing countries?  
•  They should liberalize service imports because, and as long as, this is advantageous for their econo-
mies.8 Like every other country, they should liberalize primarily for their own benefit, not for some-
one else’s.  
____________________ 
6 Acting unilaterally, a large country might also be tempted to pursue an “optimum tariff” policy by which it would effec-
tively use its market power to manipulate the terms of trade in its favor. When pursued by several actors, such optimum tariff 
policies would become self-defeating; the multilateral trading system helps governments avoid being drawn into spiraling 
protectionism (Bagwell and Staiger 2002). 
7 If there is any lesson from the failure of the Cancun Ministerial, it would seem to be this one. Developing countries as a 
group are now too important trading partners for multilateral negotiations to move forward without their active participation 
in liberalization, including in areas of export interest to high-income countries 
8 See Chapter 5 below for a discussion of potential benefits of service import liberalization, distinguishing inter alia between 
service sectors. 10 
•  Unilateral liberalization should be pursued if it is politically feasible. There would be no point in 
waiting for the outcome of multilateral negotiations if a particular measure is advantageous and can 
be implemented through the domestic political process, in spite of possible opposition from special 
interests. Furthermore, liberalizing countries may seek credit (i.e., additional market access) from 
trading partners for “autonomous” (i.e., unilateral) liberalization under the “Modalities for the 
Treatment of Autonomous Liberalization” issued by the Council for Trade in Services on March 6, 
2003, without initially having to bind the newly liberalized regulations.9 
•  However, it may be possible to achieve more comprehensive import liberalization, over domestic 
opposition from special interests, as part of a multilaterally agreed, cross-sector liberalization pack-
age that includes measures of interest to a country’s exporters (such as cuts in agricultural protec-
tion or textile tariffs). Therefore, it makes sense, in principle, for developing countries to remain in-
volved in multilateral negotiations on service liberalizations, subject to the various caveats made in 
this paper.  
•  As a signaling and commitment device to increase the credibility of import liberalization, commit-
ments under the GATS may be less important for many developing countries than IFI conditionality 
(either for project loans for the sector concerned, or for World Bank or IMF structural adjustment 
loans). 
2.3 Negotiating  Procedures 
Negotiations on services during the Doha Round use the “request and offer” method, with extensive 
bilateral negotiations whose results would ultimately become multilaterally applicable through the 
most-favored nation provision (WTO Document S/L/93 of 29 March 2001). This section addresses 
concerns about whether the interests of developing countries are safeguarded under this approach, 
particularly as they face major players such as the EU and the U.S. in their bilateral talks.  
The request-offer approach ideally involves each participant sending out a request to every other 
participant, asking the trading partner to undertake certain commitments to liberalize its imports. Each 
country responds to the received requests with an offer in the form of a draft schedule of commitments 
(WTO 2002; OECD 2003a). Since the draft schedule will normally fall short of the combined wish list 
received from trading partners, there would follow an iterative process involving bilateral, plurilateral, 
and, at some point, multilateral consultation. Ultimately, this process is expected to yield a draft 
schedule of commitments for each country that is acceptable to all other participants, given the overall 
outcome of negotiations in all areas covered by the trade round. Accordingly, draft schedules for ser-
vices could potentially differ widely across participants, depending on their policy preferences, capac-
ity to cope with adjustment costs (i.e., their level of development), etc. (Maurin 2003). 
This procedure ensures, on the one hand, that the “bottom up” approach is followed in liberalizing 
trade in services (which is why it was strongly favored by some large developing countries including 
India). On the other hand, this procedure raises the question of how a degree of dynamism for sub-
stantive liberalization can be created in this framework, or even how a meaningful outcome can be 
reached at all. First, the very different sizes and trade volumes of participants lead to lop-sided bilat-
eral negotiations. For example, it is difficult to imagine the EU or the U.S. making a major “conces-
sion” (see Section 2.2 on this use of language) in response to a request from a small developing coun-
try. Likewise, it is difficult to see what such “lop-sided” bilateral talks can accomplish beyond con-
veying an initial understanding of each side’s concerns. Second, if national schedules differ widely, it 
will be difficult to establish the implicit reciprocity that is the core of any negotiation. Without some 
____________________ 
9 The Modalities are available at: http://www.wto.org/english/news_e/pres03_e/pr335_e.htm. The Modalities are as yet un-
tested; it is therefore impossible to predict how much additional market access unilateral liberalizers can secure for their ex-
ports in this manner. 11 
form of yardstick, it will even be difficult to establish whether there has been significant liberalization 
at all.10  
These observations suggest that the bilateral request-offer process should be complemented, at an 
early point during the negotiations, with a formula-based approach of some sort. The obvious diffi-
culty with devising appropriate formulas is that trade barriers in services take many different forms 
(compared to trade in goods where there are only a few types of barriers which, moreover, lend them-
selves to quantification; Thompson 2000; see also Chapter 4). Hence, the “formulas” for service liber-
alization will tend to be qualitative rather than quantitative, such as “undertake named specific com-
mitments in a named sector,” “abolish substantially all MFN exemptions based on reciprocity,” “make 
named commitments on Mode 4,” “adopt reference paper on basic telecommunications,” etc. Unless 
such formulas are highly sector-specific (and hence in potential conflict with the “bottom up” ap-
proach), they are likely to be less specific and, hence, verifiable than, say, a decision to tariffy nontar-
iff barriers on agricultural imports or to cut average import tariffs on manufactures by a certain per-
centage. Different levels of development, policy preferences, etc. would still have to be taken into ac-
count. Nevertheless, such formulas would help to harness negotiating synergies among smaller and 
weaker participants, facilitate the setting up of individual country schedules while providing an ele-
ment of comparability across members, and provide useful yardsticks against which commitments by 
each country could be measured. As a way of increasing transparency, formula approaches could also 
involve adopting particular scheduling techniques as proposed in the model schedules on maritime 
transport or basic telecommunications. By their very nature, formulas would be best discussed in a 
multilateral setting, presumably on the basis of position papers by key players or groups of countries. 
In considering the position of developing countries under the request-offer procedure, it is useful to 
review possible alternatives. In the past, important trade negotiations took place mostly bilaterally 
among the key players. While developing countries benefited from the outcome through the MFN 
clause, their specific concerns did not feature. Since the failed Seattle Ministerial in 1999, there ap-
pears to be a consensus that the interests of developing countries should have a larger weight, particu-
larly in the present, “Development” round of negotiations. It was this shift in emphasis, combined with 
the GATS emphasis on adapting liberalization to each country’s particular conditions, that led to the 
present request-offer process. The flip side of this coin is that without substantive liberalization on 
their part, developing countries are unlikely to obtain significant “concessions” (this use of language is 
discussed in Section 2.2) from developed countries, be it on services or in any other area. On balance, 
it is difficult to see how progress could be made in negotiations other than through bilateral consulta-
tions that lead on to more structured negotiations in a plurilateral or multilateral setting. 
What follows from this discussion for the position of developing countries in negotiations? 
•  Once again, it is essential that developing countries enter negotiations with a clear view of their own 
priorities for liberalizing their own service imports, in order to improve their own economic welfare 
(Hoekman 2000; Hoekman and Messerlin 2000). Developing countries’ offers should reflect their 
strategies; negotiators should not be overly impressed by the wish lists/requests that they may 
receive from the major players in the negotiations, including the EU and U.S.. 
•  While bilateral discussions with key players on their requests or offers are certainly helpful for un-
derstanding their priorities, small trading partners such as developing countries are well-advised to 
join forces with countries with similar underlying strategies to gain weight in sthe negotiations, 
working toward “formulas” that can be pursued in more advanced multilateral discussions. Nego-
tiators ultimately face an inevitable trade-off between highly country-specific liberalization meas-
ures, which fully take national sensitivities into account, and the logic of multilateral liberalization, 
which calls for multiple parties to simultaneously liberalize in a verifiable and broadly similar 
manner (though not necessarily to a uniform level of market access and national treatment).  
____________________ 
10 This problem is exacerbated by the fact that data on international trade in services are less reliable and substantive than for 
trade in goods and that the impact of trade barriers is much more difficult to quantify (see Chapter 4). 12 
3  Assessing the Benefits and Costs of Service Liberalization for 
Developing Countries: Institutional and Methodological Issues 
An assessment of the potential benefits and costs of trade liberalization in services is not only a pre-
condition for individual countries to be able to formulate negotiating strategies (see Chapter  2). 
Art. XIX(3) of the GATS also calls on the Council for Trade in Services to “carry out an assessment of 
trade in services in overall terms and on a sectoral basis” with reference to GATS objectives in general 
and the increasing participation of developing countries in particular (Art. IV(1)) “for the purpose of” 
establishing negotiating guidelines and procedures. In 2001, the Council for Trade in Services issued 
negotiating guidelines (WTO Document S/L/93) without having undertaken a comprehensive assess-
ment. Therefore, some NGO observers, including many opposed to trade liberalization in principle, 
have called for negotiations on services to be halted until after a full assessment. It has also been sug-
gested that an “independent organization” should undertake this assessment, rather than the WTO 
(e.g., Woodroffe 2002). 
There is no basis for either demand in the GATS. GATS Art. IV(1) explicitly assigns responsibility 
for the assessment to the Council for Trade in Services. Furthermore, membership of the Council for 
Trade in Services is open to representatives from all WTO members; in fact, a large number of devel-
oping country members actively participate in its proceedings. Council members obviously felt that 
they had all the information on the effects of liberalization that they needed for the limited purpose of 
issuing negotiating guidelines. Since negotiating guidelines are about procedure rather than substance 
(see Section 2.3 above), it is difficult to see why these guidelines would require modification in light 
of any conceivable outcome of a “full and comprehensive assessment.” 
There remain, at the same time, important methodological issues related to assessing the benefits 
and costs of trade liberalization in services that affect governments formulating their negotiating posi-
tions. These include (i) how to account for noneconomic costs of liberalization; (ii) how to weigh dis-
tributional effects against aggregate welfare gains; (iii) how to make sense of the wide range of em-
pirical estimates of economic benefits of liberalization; and (iv) in light of the above, how assessments 
of the effects of trade liberalization in services and future research should be organized.  
First, much concern has been voiced about how liberalization of certain services may affect noneco-
nomic policy objectives. For example, in education, the print media, or audiovisual services, domestic 
or regional production or control over production may be viewed as a desirable expression of a coun-
try’s cultural identity. Such noneconomic benefits are not amenable to the methods of economic 
analysis discussed below. However, within the GATS negotiating framework, it is straightforward to 
think of them as part of a country’s political preferences. As discussed in Chapter 2, the GATS leaves 
countries free to maintain exemptions from horizontal commitments (such as MFN treatment) or not to 
make specific commitments for a particular sector in order to protect noneconomic political objectives. 
Clearly, this may not be costless; countries forego an economic welfare gain (for example, greater 
availability or lower prices of imported audiovisual material) by maintaining restrictions. However, it 
is up to national policy-makers to decide whether the noneconomic benefits of such restrictions are 
worth their economic cost. 
Second, the liberalization of international trade in certain services may negatively impact on poor 
people’s access to those services, particularly when the policy regime for a sector is simultaneously re-
formed and implicit or explicit subsidies are eliminated. This issue has frequently been encountered in 
the privatization of public utilities such as water or energy distribution when retail prices were raised 
to cover long-run marginal costs and pay for improvements in service quality (such as the elimination 
of periodic electricity blackouts). One key observation here is that the issue arises not so much be-
cause of international trade in services (typically, through new FDI in the particular sector) but be-
cause of the elimination of subsidies and the introduction of a new domestic policy regime. The effects 13 
on the poor depend less on whether the privatized utility is domestically or foreign-owned than on the 
new regulation of the sector, especially whether more targeted forms of support for the poor replace 
price subsidies. In any event, the GATS does not prescribe particular modes of organizing essential 
services, including whether services are provided by the government (in which case they are outside 
the purview of the GATS) or commercially or by competing suppliers (in which case they are covered 
by the GATS; see Section 2.1). This leaves national policy-makers free to weigh the costs of alterna-
tive schemes to protect the poor against the benefits in terms of reduced poverty, without their choices 
being limited by the GATS.  
Third, estimates of the income effects of liberalization from existing studies vary considerably. It is 
therefore important to understand the strengths and weaknesses of the research methods employed. 
While Chapters 4 and 5 below deal with some aspects of this discussion in detail, it is useful at this 
stage to summarize several robust findings and their implications for developing countries: 
•  The benefits from liberalizing service imports depend crucially on whether competition is effec-
tively enhanced. Simply replacing a public monopoly with a private monopoly (for example, in the 
case of a network-based utility) will not necessarily make much difference in terms of the price and 
quality of the services provided (although a private investor may be able to undertake investments 
that a credit-constrained government cannot afford). Therefore, in the GATS context at least, 
network monopolies are not priority areas for developing country governments to enter into 
commitments.11  
• Protecting the access by the poor to essential services involves regulatory issues that are not 
straightforward (see World Bank 2003 for a very useful survey and detailed analysis). It is con-
ceivable that liberalization and privatization have sometimes occurred under time pressure (for ex-
ample, because the fiscal cost of an existing arrangement had become unsustainable) and therefore 
in a less than fully planned fashion, including in the context of World Bank or IMF conditionality. 
Indeed, when the existing policy regime is no longer fiscally sustainable, reforms following a trial 
and error pattern may be the only way forward. However, it would be premature, in such an envi-
ronment, to tie down the evolving policy framework through commitments under the GATS. 
Commitments would need to be based on a thorough understanding of the regulatory and distribu-
tional issues involved in sectoral reform as well as the way in which the (sometimes unclear) pro-
visions of the GATS limit future policy choices if a commitment were made (see Section 2.1). 
•  Empirically based simulation (computable general equilibrium) models show consistently that the 
liberalizing country itself is the greatest beneficiary of its own (well-targeted) reforms. Furthermore, 
barriers to imports of services, especially producer services, are substantially higher than barriers to 
merchandise imports in all countries, and tend to be even higher in developing countries than 
elsewhere.12 Therefore, developing countries can expect to reap fairly large income gains from 
comprehensive liberalization of trade in services, even without major changes in developed country 
barriers (OECD 2003b). 
•  One driving force behind the relatively large income gains from trade liberalization, especially in a 
dynamic perspective, is additional foreign direct investment in response to liberalized service im-
ports. Clearly, however, FDI depends on more than the policy environment for a particular service 
sector. Countries will only reap the benefits of liberalization if their overall investment climate is 
sufficiently attractive for international investors (see, for example, Nunnenkamp and Spatz 2003). 
____________________ 
11 The telecommunications industry is an important exemption because the monopoly status of land lines is eroded by 
alternative technologies (e.g., mobile phones) and because the sector involves several separate markets with their own tech-
nological characteristics (e.g., local vs. international calls). 
12 If producer services are more highly protected than downstream industries (i.e., their customers), protection of producer 
services becomes an effective tax on downstream industries. In practice, this will tend to hurt the international competitive-
ness precisely of those manufacturing industries in which developing countries tend to enjoy a comparative advantage. 14 
•  A recent sector-by-sector survey of developing country service exports under Modes 1 and 2 (cross-
border supply and consumption by nonresidents in developing countries) reveals a significant 
potential for expansion (OECD 2003b). However, the income gains from higher exports under those 
modes pale in comparison to the gains from a more liberal regime in high-income countries for 
temporary stays of natural persons from developing countries (Mode 4), as long as “temporary” 
stays are not defined too narrowly. Although progress will be politically difficult to achieve, this is 
clearly one area where existing restrictions in high-income countries represent the main bottleneck 
preventing higher service exports by developing countries.  
Fourth, given these indications of the state of knowledge on the effects of liberalized trade in ser-
vices, how should the assessment of the effects of liberalization proceed? Well-targeted import liber-
alization by developing countries clearly holds out the prospect of substantial income gains. Apart 
from crucial methodological refinements (e.g., the measurement of trade barriers in service sectors), 
more work is needed on identifying priority sectors for liberalization on a country-by-country, sector-
by-sector basis. Similarly, the gains to developing countries from more liberal regimes for the tempo-
rary movement of natural persons (Mode  4) in high-income countries would be potentially huge. 
High-income countries themselves should, on aggregate, also benefit from an inflow of temporary 
workers, although their relative wage structure would change and real wages for low-skilled workers 
might even decline. More work would be helpful on how those negative effects can be contained, as 
well as on the possible negative impact on developing countries from the brain drain inevitably associ-
ated with temporary migration. 
In sum, what is required is a multi-faceted, largely country- and sector-specific assessment of the ef-
fects of more liberal trade in services. By its very nature, such analysis will involve a wide range of 
contributors from governments, civil society, academia, and international organizations. Depending on 
their political preferences and the influence of special interests, governments are bound to draw differ-
ent conclusions from the evidence for their negotiating positions. Occasional reviews of the state of 
knowledge in these areas by the Council for Trade in Services may be useful, not least for negotiators 
from small or poor countries who may find it difficult to follow this evolving literature. There is no 
discernible need, however, for the Council to agree on detailed conclusions from this large body of re-
search. Since the GATS negotiating framework leaves members free to limit liberalization to areas 
where they feel confident about the likely effects, each member would expect to determine its negoti-
ating positions in accordance with their own conclusions from the ongoing debate. 
4  Barriers to Trade in Services: Liberalization Potential  
and Access Barriers 
4.1 Liberalization  Potential 
When services were brought into the brief of the newly created WTO at the 1994 Marrakesh Ministe-
rial, a framework for negotiations and commitments on service sector liberalization was created, but 
little actual liberalization occurred. Hence, without having an idea how narrow or wide-sweeping the 
commitments might be and actually not really aware of how large the access barriers were, little could 
be forecast and turned into sensible hard numbers on the impact of the liberalization. It is thus hardly 
surprising to determine that the initial major estimates of the impact of the Uruguay Round (UR) basi-
cally ignored the service sector: Only one estimate included the service sector, and it was viewed as 
accounting for a mere 14 percent of welfare gains from liberalization and market access improvements 15 
(see Table 1.1). Overall the largest welfare gains were attributed to the elimination of barriers to trade 
in the exportation of textile and clothing products, followed by the agriculture sector. 
In the meantime, however, it has become quite apparent that the potential global impact of the liber-
alization in the service sector is immense (see Chapter 5). In a recent general equilibrium model, 
which includes foreign direct investment, Dee and Hanslow (2000) show how a “comprehensive re-
moval of restrictions on all modes of service supply, including restrictions on services delivered via 
FDI … will impact on developing countries ... [they are] projected to be better off by U.S.$130 billion. 
The services sectors in most developing countries are projected to expand much more rapidly than de-
veloped economies [see Table 4.1].13 As their relatively high restrictions on entry are removed, their 
services sectors develop, primarily funded by FDI, and they become major exporters of services” 
(McGuire 2002: 9–11). 
Table 4.1: 
Effects of Liberalizing Trade in Servicesa,b (Percentage and U.S.$ millions) 
  Change in real income by sector 
 Percentage  change  Absolute change in U.S. dollars 
 Primary  & 
secondary 
Tertiary Total  Primary  & 
secondary 
Tertiary Total 
Developing Economies           
Chile  0.7  0.4  1.1  45 330 375 
China   3.4  14.6  18.0  14,088  90,869  104,957 
Indonesia   0.7  5.1  5.9  1,451  2  470 
Malaysia   3.7   0.7   4.5  3,532  1,015  4,547 
Mexico   0.3   0.1   0.4  –83  357  274 
Philippines   5.1   0.4    5.5  1,601 1,236 2,837 
Republic of Korea   1.5   0.1   1.6  8,784  1,886  10,670 
Taiwan Prov. of China   2.7   0.2   3.0  11,659  –142  11,517 
Thailand   2.6   0.2   2.8  4,063  1,698  5,762 
Rest of the Cairns Group   1.2   0.1  1.3  12,766  6,970  19,736 
Rest of the world   1.1   0.8    1.9  11,324 23,039 34  363 
Total          69,230 129,728 198,959 
Developed Economies          
Australia   0.2   0.0   0.2  1,994  2,098  4,092 
Canada   0.1   –0.1   0.0  539  499  –1,038 
European Union   0.1   0.0   0.1  6,394  –6,169  225 
Hong Kong (China)  0.2   1.0   0.9  916  5,896  6,812 
Japan   0.3   0.0  0.3  20,964  4,130  25,094 
New Zealand   1.2   –0.1   1.1  4,400  257  4,657 
Singapore   –0.3   –1.3   –1.5  7,421  –247  7,174 
United States   0.2   –0.1    0.1  22,734 –1,809 20,925 
Total         64,284  3,657  67,941 
World          133,514 133,385 266,900 
aFigures may not add up to total because of rounding. — bThese are the projected gains in real income about 10 years after 
liberalization has occurred and the associated resource adjustments have taken place. 
Source: Dee and Hanslow (2001: 18). 
____________________ 
13 An examination of restrictiveness indices across seven service sectors revealed that on average foreign service providers 
in service sectors in developing countries were more restrictive than those in developed countries by 32 percent. The index 
for the most restrictive sector (banking) was 322 percent higher in developing countries than in developed countries; the in-
dex for the least restrictive sector (distribution) was 10 percent higher. Based on own calculations from WTO (2003: 142). 16 
But how large is the potential in developing countries? The importance of eliminating barriers to 
trade in services is expressed not only in the sheer size of services in the world economy, where it 
amounts to roughly 60 percent of GDP. Almost as important is their economic share in developing 
countries, where roughly 80 economies reveal a service sector exceeding 50 percent. Furthermore, 
over 85 percent of the developing countries listed in the World Development Report (World Bank 
2003) have larger service sectors than industrial sectors. And, given that roughly one-third of world 
trade can be seen as being generated by services (Karsenty 2000) it is hardly correct any more to con-
sider services to be of nontraded nature. As Karsenty points out, traditional trade in services, that is 
cross border transactions, is larger than establishment-related trade in services. 
Furthermore, knowing that some of those countries relatively most dependent on services are also 
some of the poorest (e.g., Armenia, Lesotho, and Kiribati) there is every reason to ensure that barriers 
to service trade are eliminated to ensure that their welfare potential can be tapped. As a matter of fact, 
as Dee and Hanslow (2001) contend, eliminating such barriers to trade in services could equal the 
elimination of trade barriers in agriculture and in industrial products. But what are the barriers to trade 
in services? 
4.2  Barriers to Access 
As large as the above-mentioned potential might be, tapping it is much more difficult than in the case 
of merchandise trade. There, at least, import tariff rates are a known quantity, whereas most measures 
restricting trade in services are of a nontariff nature (i.e., difficult to capture and portray) and most 
measures also occur behind the border. The question is how to classify nontariff measures/barriers14 
so as to allow their relative importance as well as their possible impact to be portrayed and then to de-
velop a clear picture of how distorted/restricted an economy is vis-à-vis imports of goods and services. 
Numerous classifications of NTBs for goods have been put forth (see Tables 4.2a and 4.2b). While 
such classifications help to better understand the scope of nontariff measures (NTMs), they say little 
about how pervasive such measures are. If their impact can be expressed in terms of additional time 
spent in moving the goods to the final destination, then implicit tariff equivalents could be imputed in 
line with Hummels (2001). The method he used incorporated the calculation of the increase in the fi-
nal landed price due to an additional day on the road. But in many cases, as can be deduced from Ta-
ble 4.2, the extra time spent and hence the tariff equivalent of such measures would be subject to wide 
variations if they could be captured at all with this method.15 In any case, the initial barriers to trade 
applied to goods entering a country today are governed by the basic GATT 1947 principles. They are 
primarily ad valorem tariffs on f.o.b. values, applied on an MFN basis. Hence, the extent of protection 
that they afford is easy to calculate. 
In the area of services the story is much more complicated as there is no tariff equivalent which can 
be quickly compared to merchandise trade barriers. How then can barriers be assessed and formulated 
in terms of protection equivalents for cross border transactions (Mode  1), consumption abroad 
(Mode 2), commercial presence (Mode 3), and presence/movement of people (Mode 4)? In practically 
all of the above cases one is talking about regulatory barriers which do not necessarily discriminate 
against foreigners but frequently prevent any new entry in the specific service sector.  
____________________ 
14 As Bora (2003: 1) points out the literature uses both the term “non-tariff barriers” as well as “non-tariff measures.” The ra-
tionale of “measure” is that it captures policies like export subsidies. An export subsidy, which is supposed to increase the 
exports for a specific sector, can hardly be called a barrier, at least not in the country in which it is granted. It could, however, 
be considered a barrier for those exports hit by the subsidized exports; but using such a definition would extend beyond what 
is normally understood. 
15 Here again difficulties occur because, even without a formal distinction, a given measure may in practice be applied 
differently to domestic vs. foreign businesses. Table 4.2a: 
Comparison of UNCTAD and Deardorff and Stern Taxonomies of 
NTMs 
UNCTAD TRAINs  Deardorff and Stern 
Price control measures 
Administrative pricing 




Finance control measures 
Advance payment requirements 
Multiple exchange rates 
Restrictive official foreign exchange allocation 
Regulations concerning terms of payment for 
imports 
Transfer delays 








Export restraint arrangements 
Enterprise specific restrictions 
Monopolistic measures 
Single channel for imports 




Special customs formalities 
Obligation to return used products 








Quantitative restrictions and similar specific 




Voluntary export restraints 
Exchange and other financial controls 
Prohibitions 
Domestic content and mixing requirements 
Discriminatory bilateral agreements 
Countertrade 
Nontariff charges and related policies affecting 
imports 
Variable levies 
Advance deposit requirement 
Antidumping duties 
Countervailing duties 
Border tax adjustments 
Government participation in trade; restrictive 
practices; general policy 
Subsidies and other aids 
Government procurement policies 
State trading, government monopolies, and 
exclusive franchises 
Government industrial policy and regional 
development measures 
Government financed research and development; 
technology policies 
National systems of taxation and social insurance 
Macroeconomic policies 
Competition policies 
Foreign investment policies 
Foreign corruption policies 
Immigration policies 
Customs procedures and administrative practices 
Customs valuation procedures 
Customs classification procedures 
Customs clearance procedures 
Technical barriers to trade 
Health and sanitary regulations and quality 
standards 
Safety and industrial standards and regulations 
Packaging and labelling regulations, including 
trademarks 
Advertising and media regulations 
Source: Bora (2003:14). 
Table 4.2b:  





Part I  Government Participation in Trade and Restrictive Practices 
Tolerated by Governments 
A  Governments aids 
B  Countervailing duties 
C  Government procurement 
D  Restrictive practices tolerated by governments 
E  State trading, government monopoly practices, etc. 
Part II  Customs and Administrative Entry Procedures 
A  Anti-dumping duties 
B  Valuation 
C  Customs classification 
D  Consular formalities and documentation 
E  Samples 
F  Rules of origin 
G  Customs formalities 
Part III  Technical Barriers to Trade 
A  General 
B  Technical regulations and standards 
C  Testing and certification arrangements 
Part IV  Specific Limitations 
A  Quantitative restrictions and import licensing 
B  Embargoes and other restrictions of similar effect 
C  Screen-time quotas and other mixing regulations 
D  Exchange control 
E  Discrimination resulting from bilateral agreements 
F  Discriminatory sourcing 
G  Export restraints 
H  Measures to regulate domestic prices 
I  Tariff quotas 
J  Export taxes 
K  Requirements concerning marking, labelling and packaging 
L  Others 
Part V  Charges on Import 
A  Prior import deposits 
B  Surcharges, port taxes, statistical taxes, etc. 
C  Discriminatory film taxes, use taxes, etc. 
D  Discriminatory credit restrictions 
E  Border tax adjustments 
F  Emergency action 
Source: WTO document TN/MA/S5, 11 September, 2002. 18 
Examples of Types of Barriers by Mode 
Some examples may be given in the following list: 
Mode 1: Restricted access to e-commerce; 
Mode 2: Medsical treatment abroad not covered by consumer’s home country health insurance; 
Mode 3: Commercial presence permitted but stipulations on location/number of branches; 
Mode 4: Expertise drawn from abroad not accepted because local credentials required. 
It is obvious from this brief list that putting a hard number on the tariff equivalent of such barriers is 
not possible. We are dealing with an area here where market failures and where natural monopolies 
can occur (e.g., telecommunications, air transport). Furthermore, professional services, health, and 
education must be considered to encompass asymmetric information. In many cases the restrictions 
applied to service sector entry were initially possibly imposed to deal with market failures, and at that 
point in time not really intended to be protective. But, as often the case, the underlying reasons for 
such fiefs tended to be forgotten, so that permanent claims were staked and protectionist structures 
evolved. 
Measuring Barriers to Service Trade 
As in the case of goods one possible approach to measuring the size of barriers to trade might be to 
simply compare the price of services in various countries. Deardorff and Stern (1997) have shown, 
however, that comparing the price of a can of Coke in different countries has little to do with compar-
ing the price of telephone calls. The reason is simply that services are highly differentiated products 
(Ethier and Horn 1991). They are differentiated by: 
−  economies, due to different legal systems or accounting systems; 
−  firms, which differ due to firm-specific human capital; 
−  needs/demands in the various countries; 
−  fixed training costs, R&D in headquarters lead to economies of scale; 
−  services with industrial organization characteristics of multinationals. 
For example, a domestic telephone call over the distance of 800 km in Germany is different from a 
call of the same distance in Canada due to technical, legal, and accounting systems. Or in the case of 
legal services, regulations can keep out foreign lawyers by allowing them to practice only home-coun-
try law. Furthermore, economic activities in different countries reflect different needs and demands, be 
it by firms or individuals. A tax accountant in Hong Kong will be asked entirely different questions 
than one in Mumbai. Likewise the divorce services a lawyer provides in Tokyo are different than those 
in Auckland. But even here, these differences are all the greater, knowing that needs and demands dif-
fer between individuals and professionals in a given country and have to be adapted accordingly. 
Similarly, services provided by Microsoft are different from those of any other software company be-
cause of Microsoft’s firm-specific human capital. The development and maintenance of fixed and sunk 
costs, the organizational model involving product differentiation and economies of scale are all attrib-
utes of multinational firms, which also fits well to service industries (Markusen 1995). 
Given this high degree of differentiation, the use of domestic/foreign price comparison techniques 
or other associated measures (e.g., producer/consumer subsidy equivalents) is not appropriate. “All 
such price comparison measures assume that the foreign price is a good ‘benchmark’ measure of what 
the domestic price would be in the absence of the trade distortions. But this presupposes that the do-
mestic and foreign goods are perfect substitutes. For services, this is not the case” (Dee 2003a: 4). 
Instead, counterfactual evidence needs to be constructed from econometric models about determi-
nants of domestic prices; in other words, estimating what the domestic price would be in absence of 
distortions. These studies have been carried out using cross-country datasets to quantify “a cross- 
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country average” relation between barriers and performance, controlling for all other factors that affect 
performance. They have either been carried out across specific industries to estimate the sectoral ef-
fects or were applied with economy-wide models to try to pick up the overall effects of service trade 
barriers (see overview in Table 4.3). 
Table 4.3: 
Sectoral and Economy-Wide Studies of the Effects of Service Trade (and Other Regulatory) Barriers 
Sector in which barriers 
occur 









  Doove et al. (2001)  Airfares  Level  Cross-country 
Banking  Kalirajan et al. (2000)  Net interest margin  Level  Cross-country 




  Barth et al. (2004)  Bank developmenta 
Net interest margin 
Overhead cost 
Nonperforming loans 
Probability of bank crisis 
Level Cross-country 
  Dee (2003b)  Net interest margin  Level  Cross-country 
Distribution Kalirajan  (2000)  Cost  Level  Cross-country 
Electricity generation  Steiner (2000)  Price 
Utilization rates 
Reserve plant margins 
Level Panel 
  Doove et al. (2001)  Price  Level  Panel 
Maritime Kang  (2000)  Price  Level  Cross-country 
  Fink et al. (2001)  Price  Level  Cross-country 
  Clark et al. (2002)  Costs  Level  Panel 
Professions: engineering  Nguyen-Hong (2000)  Price 
Costs 
Level Cross-country 
Telecommunications Warren  (2000)  Quantity 
Price 
Level Cross-country 
 Trewin  (2000)  Cost  Level  Panel 




  Doove et al. (2001)  Price  Level  Panel 
 Dee  (2003b)  Quantity 
Price 
Level Cross-country 




Construction  Hoekman/Francois (1999)  Aggregate service exports  Level  Cross-country 
Finance  Francois/Schuknecht (2000)  Not defined  Growth  Cross-country 
  Eschenbach/Francois (2002)  Per capita GDP  Growth  Panel 
  Mattoo et al. (2001)  Per capita GNP  Growth  Panel 
Telecommunications  Hoekman/Francois (1999)  Aggregate service exports  Level  Cross-country 
  Mattoo et al. (2001)  Per capita GNP  Growth  Panel 
aBank credit to the private sector as a share of GDP. 
Source: Updated from Dee (2003b). 20 
4.3 Measuring  Restrictions 
Table 4.3 summarizes recent studies that measure systematically barriers to service imports. Basically, 
these studies start from qualitative information about individual restrictions, assess and quantify their 
impact, and summarize this information into an index.16 More specifically: 
•  First, qualitative information on restrictions and regulations is gathered from international organiza-
tions (WTO, UNCTAD, trade organizations, governments, etc.). 
•  Second, the information is classified by grouping similar restrictions together so their degree of re-
strictiveness can be compared across countries. 
•  Third, an index is developed to classify restrictions by their restrictiveness or openness. The index 
uses scores and weights to turn the qualitative into quantitative information. Scores are used to 
designate the strength of the impact of restrictions, and weights are used to capture their presumed 
relative importance. The restrictiveness index usually covers the range 0 to 1, whereby 0 is most 
open and 1 is most restrictive. 
•  Fourth, the total index is then calculated across the service sectors. 
Using McGuire’s (2003: 41) simple example it is easy to perceive how a relatively clear picture can 
be developed about the restictiveness/openness of a set of rules/regulations determining the issuing of 
banking licenses (Table 4.4). The simplicity and straightforwardness of the method does not mean, 
however, that the index ”objectively” reflects the impact of the restrictions, since judgments have to be 
made about the degree of restrictiveness and the importance of the restriction. Nonetheless, given the 
wealth of literature on the impact of regulations it would seem to be possible to capture the overall 
thrust of rules and regulations. This is all the more the case if—where necessary—country-specific 
characteristics have been incorporated into the index 
For example, the restrictiveness index for banking licenses (Table 4.4) can be expanded to cover all 
banking services provided by domestic and foreign institutions (Table 4.5). Figure 4.1 summarizes the 
degree to which a given country’s regulations discriminate between foreign and domestic service pro-
viders. Applying this approach to banking services across a set of countries yields Figure 4.2, which 
provides a relatively good first-cut insight into major differences across countries.17 It is then possible, 
for example, to examine whether such discriminatory differences can be related to specific economic 
and financial difficulties in the specific countries. 
In a broader sense, such restrictiveness/openness indices lend themselves to investigating whether 
liberalization has indeed led to positive economic and social developments. Figure 4.3 shows that 
countries with higher restrictiveness indices for their service sectors tended to be poorer in terms of 
GDP per capita. This raises the question of how, specifically, causality runs from restrictions on ser-
vice imports to economic development. 
To the extent that certain barriers for a given industry can be identified and quantified, it would be 
possible to use this information to determine how these barriers have contributed, relative to other 
factors, to a country’s overall economic and social development. For example, since the financial ser-
vice industry plays a key role in economic development, how has its efficiency been affected by re-
strictions and what has been the impact on economic growth (Chapter 6)?  
____________________ 
16 As McGuire (2003: 38) points out, there are two different approaches to determining the impact. One concentrates on 
measuring the level of restrictions on services by converting qualitative information about import barriers into quantitative in-
formation. The other seeks to measure the impact of rectrictions on the price-cost margins. The above sections draws heavily 
on the excellent overview prepared for the OECD by McGuire (2003). 
17 As McGuire notes (2000: 14–15) the scores for each restriction are based on judgment as to how binding it is. For in-
stance, a restriction limiting the number of banking licenses is considered to be more restrictive than one which issues new 
banking licenses only if prudential criteria are fulfilled. The various restriction categories are finally weighted together based 
on judgments vis-à-vis there economic costs, given best information available. For example: restrictions on banking licenses 
considered to be more severe than restrictions on temporary movement of people. The weights are chosen so that the index 
ranges from 0 to 1.   21 
Table 4.4: 
Calculating a Restrictiveness Index on Distribution of Banking Licenses 
Weight for type  
of restriction 




Restrictions on banking licenses 
0.25  0.00  1.00  No new banking licenses available 
  0.50  0.50  No foreign banking licenses available 
 1.00  0.00  Banking licenses granted if prevailing 
prudential requirements met 
Table 4.5: 
Restriction Categories for Banking Services 








Restrictions on commercial presence      
Licensing of banks  Yes 0.200 Yes 0.190 
Based inversely on the maximum number of new banking licenses 
issued with only prudential requirements 
     
Direct investment  Yes 0.200 Yes 0.190 
Based inversely on the maximum equity participation permitted in 
an existing domestic bank 
     
Joint venture arrangements  Yes 0.100  No  n.a. 
New bank entry only through joint venture with a domestic bank         
Permanent movement of people  Yes 0.020  No  n.a. 
Based inversely on years that executives, specialists, and/or senior 
managers can stay 
     
Other restrictions      
Raising funds by banks  Yes 0.100 Yes 0.143 
Banks are restricted from accepting deposits from the public and/or 
raising funds from domestic capital markets 
     
Lending funds by banks  Yes 0.100 Yes 0.143 
Banks are restricted in types or sizes of loans and/or are directed to 
lend to housing and small business 
     
Other business of banks—insurance and securities services  Yes 0.200 Yes 0.095 
Banks are excluded from insurance and/or securities services         
Expanding the number of banking outlets  Yes 0.050 Yes 0.048 
Based inversely on the number of outlets permitted         
Composition of the board of directors  Yes 0.020  No  n.a. 
Based inversely on the percentage of the board that can comprise 
foreigners 
     
Temporary movement of people  Yes 0.010  No.  n.a. 
Based inversely on the number of days temporary entry permitted to 
executives, specialists, and/or senior managers 
     
Total weighting or highest possible score   1.000  0.808 
Source: McGuire and Schuele (2000: Tables 12.1 and 12.3, pp. 204–5, 208). 
Against this background, it is important to identify those service sectors whose efficiency is held 
back by import barriers or other restrictions, and whose high prices or low quality, in turn, inhibit a 
country from effectively tapping its development potential. Spinanger and Verma (2003) examine key 
factors determining the competitiveness of economies: What are the essential factors that determine 
how successful a given economy is in attracting investors to establish production facilities or source 




















































































































































































































































































































A measure of non-
discriminatory and
discriminatory restrictions
on foreign service suppliers
The foreign index includes
the domestic index.
Discrimination
A measure of restrictions that apply
only to foreign service suppliers.
Domestic index
A measure of nondiscriminatory 
restrictions on all service suppliers. 
 
Source: McGuire (2003: 42). 
Figure 4.2: 





























































































































































Foreign index Domestic index
 
aBased on available information on restrictions in place as at 31 December 1997. 
Source: McGuire (2003: 43). 
To find this out two surveys were carried out among 14 major textile and clothing producers and 
traders in Hong Kong in January 2000, and February/March 2003. The companies had activities in 
Hong Kong, China, throughout Asia and around the world. Some of them were major players, others 
were businesses of medium size. In all cases, the individuals had senior positions in their firms, most 
were owners, chief executive officers (CEOs), or managing directors. In all but one case were the indi-
viduals contacted in 2003 the same as those in 2000.18 In the survey they were asked to state the rela-
tive importance of 18 factors determining where they would buy/source products or invest in manu-
facturing facilities.19  Respondents were requested  to give a “gut” reply  to each factor  by responding  
____________________ 
18 For the overriding issues it is assumed that the answers apply to the economy in general and not just to the textile and 
clothing industry. 
19 The factors selected were those usually found in the relevant literature. 
Trade restrictiveness index 
The restrictiveness index measures the number and severity of restrictions on trade in
services for foreign and domestic service suppliers. The foreign and domestic indices
include restrictions on establishment and ongoing operations. Index scores generally
range from 0 to 1. The higher the score, the more restrictive an economy.    23 
Figure 4.3: 
GDP per Capita at PPP and Average Foreign Trade Restrictiveness Index Scores for the Service Sector (Score 








































Source: World Bank (2001); Productivity Commission (2001). 
Figure 4.4: 
Ranking of Factors Influencing Investment Decisions: 2003 
  1  Labor costs 
  2  Policies affecting international trade and investment 
  3  Politics and stability in host country 
  4  Policies affecting labor, health, and environment 
  5  Quality of transportation infrastructure in host country 
  6  Lack of restrictions on capital/profit transactions 
  7  Quality of telecom infrastructure in host country 
  8  Host government tax policies/incentives 
  9  Potential for exports to USA 
  10  The “culture” of host country 
  11  Education and training of workers 
  12  Potential new customers/new markets 
  13  Availability of quotas in host country 
  14  Potential for exports to EU 
  15  HKG tax policies 
  16  Availability of ready-made factory units 
  17  Potential for exports to region 
  18  Existence of Overseas Chinese Community 
Source: Based on interviews with CEOs from 14 textile/clothing companies as well as large trading companies 




























Coefficient of variation (%)24 
Table 4.6: 
List of Key Factors Determining the Competitiveness of Economies 
1  Labor costs  5  Quality of transportation infrastructure in host country 
2  Policies affecting international trade and investment  6  Lack of restrictions on capital/profit transactions 
3  Politics and stability in host country  7  Quality of telecom infrastructure in host country 
4  Policies affecting labor, health, and environment     
Source: Spinanger and Verma (2003). 
with a number between “10” if a factor was totally and absolutely important, and “1” if it was totally 
and absolutely unimportant. 
The overall results of the survey for 2003 (quite similar to the 2000 results) are presented in Figure 
4.4. They clearly portray what factors help keep countries competitive. The information provided in 
this Figure 4.4 is a plot of the average rankings (scores) given to each question (on the vertical axis) 
against the coefficient of variation (on the horizontal axis). The resulting downward-sloping pattern 
portrays those questions with little variation in rankings between companies (i.e., low coefficient of 
variation) but high average ranking values on the upper left side of the figure and those answers with a 
high variation (i.e., high coefficient of variation) on the bottom right, but lower average ranking values 
on the left. 
Figure 4.4 clearly reveals three groupings of factors that influence investment and sourcing deci-
sions (Factors 1 through 7; 8 through 11; 12 through 18). The first group encompasses the key issues 
that shape investment and sourcing decisions, and thus the decision to tap the development potential of 
countries (Table 4.6):20 Notably, two of the seven key factors relate to the quality of service provision, 
namely transport and telecommunications infrastructure. Both are largely internationally tradable ser-
vices where the quality of service provision depends directly on policies for trade in services (Limao 
and Venables 2001). 
5  Income Effects of Service Import Liberalization  
by Developing Countries: Overview 
This chapter surveys recent studies that categorize and quantify the effects of trade liberalization in 
services. Such studies provide important background information for governments setting out to de-
termine the direction of their policies for service sector development and liberalization. At the same 
time, broad-based studies such as those presently surveyed need to be complemented with more de-
tailed, country- and sector-specific work as specific negotiating positions are developed. In line with 
our earlier discussion (see Chapter 3 above), this chapter (i) focuses on sectors that do not involve 
network monopolies and hence offer a prospect of enhanced competition post-liberalization; (ii) as-
sumes that the import barriers under review are not redundant (hence reducing them leads to higher 
imports); (iii) deals mostly with market access restrictions and denial of national treatment and does 
not extend to the possible abuse of domestic regulations as trade barriers (which does not lend itself to 
generalizations in any case); and (iv) is based on the understanding that, apart from the temporary 
movement of natural persons, developing countries will enjoy benefits from liberalization mostly to 
the extent to which they themselves liberalize (see also Hoekman 2000). 
____________________ 
20 This is assumed to prevail even if in this case they were executives (mainly Chinese, but also foreign nationals in Hong 
Kong) only in the textile/clothing sector and trading houses.   25 
5.1 Conceptual  Issues 
As background for the review of empirical studies in Section 5.2, it is useful to categorize the potential 
sources of income effects of liberalizing service imports, focusing on Modes 1 to 3.21 The immediate 
effect of reducing a (binding) trade barrier or market access restriction is to increase competition, 
leading to some combination of greater product variety, higher quality, or lower prices.22 The subse-
quent reallocation of factors of production within the economy yields the traditional static welfare ef-
fect. Typically, empirical estimates suggest that this effect is small. However, in the important case of 
producer services, several studies suggest that unless the availability and quality of such services ex-
ceed some threshold level, “downstream” manufacturing industries find it impossible to export suc-
cessfully (Markusen et al. 1999; Francois and Wooton 2000). If, following import liberalization, pre-
viously unavailable producer services become available and manufactured exports expand, the static 
welfare effects of service import liberalization are likely to be substantial .  
In addition to static welfare and income effects resulting from more appropriate specialization and 
fuller factor utilization, the liberalization of service imports also has dynamic effects through its im-
pact on capital formation. Typically, the increase in GDP estimated from these dynamic effects is a 
multiple of the static welfare effect of trade liberalization. In the case of services, such dynamic effects 
may arise directly, as restrictions on foreign direct investment are lifted, or indirectly, as economy-
wide total factor productivity and hence the rate of return on investment increase. 
In principle, the potential benefits of trade liberalization need to be weighed against its short-term 
and long-term costs. In the short run, greater import penetration may result in unemployment or under-
utilization of factors of production as inputs cannot be shifted out of declining sectors instantaneously 
and newly competitive industries expand only gradually. Though potentially important, not least po-
litically, these costs are difficult to measure since the exact adjustment path following trade liberaliza-
tion is difficult to predict. As a way of minimizing short-term adjustment costs, trade liberalization is 
typically phased in over time, allowing suppliers to adjust their capacity in time for changes in com-
petitive environment. 
In a dynamic perspective, it has been argued that some infant industries require protection during a 
start-up phase before they can achieve reductions in per unit production costs along a learning curve 
and thus become internationally competitive. As per unit production costs decline, so should protec-
tion. According to this argument, capital markets are imperfect and will not finance a new industry 
based only on the prospect of lower production costs and enhanced competitiveness in the future. 
Furthermore, government subsidies (which would be preferable to protection on welfare grounds) are 
limited by fiscal constraints. 
In principle, the GATS leaves members free to protect particular service sectors. Art. XV contains a 
negotiating mandate on subsidies that may distort trade; however, there are no current restrictions and 
the negotiating mandate explicitly calls for recognition of the role that subsidies may play as part of 
____________________ 
21 Cross-border supply (Mode 1) is defined to cover service flows from the territory of one member into the territory of an-
other member (e.g., banking or architectural services transmitted via telecommunications or mail). Consumption abroad 
(Mode 2) refers to situations where a service consumer (e.g., tourist or patient) moves into another member’s territory to ob-
tain a service. Commercial presence (Mode 3) implies that a service supplier of one member establishes a territorial presence, 
including through ownership or lease of premises, in another member’s territory to provide a service (e.g., domestic subsidi-
aries of foreign insurance companies or hotel chains). Presence of natural persons (Mode 4) consists of persons of one mem-
ber entering the territory of another member to supply a service (Art. I of the GATS). The GATS Annex on Movement of 
Natural Persons specifies that members remain free in their policies regarding citizenship, residence or access to the em-
ployment market on a permanent basis. 
22 As discussed in Chapter 3 above, if network or other monopolies in a particular sector prevent greater competition, the fol-
lowing reasoning does not apply. 26 
development programs of developing countries.23 Only after a specific commitment has been made 
does it becomes difficult to reverse it (GATS Art. XXI; see Section 2.1) and increase protection be-
yond the bound level. To the extent to which the infant-industry argument is valid, a potential cost of 
liberalization under the GATS consists in precluding the granting of infant-industry protection to a 
particular sector in the future when the desirability of such protection cannot be identified at present.  
While the infant-industry argument is theoretically sound, experience with industrial policy for 
manufacturing industries in many developing countries suggests strongly that the political process 
tends to subvert the effective provision of infant-industry protection. Very frequently, protection has 
become entrenched rather than remaining temporary, at far greater loss to the economies than could 
have been caused by any initial market imperfection. For the purpose of this paper, it is safe to assume 
that any negative effects from failing to provide infant-industry protection would be small; further-
more, they would be more than offset by the benefits that stem from eliminating the risk that infant-in-
dustry protection might become entrenched.  
5.2 Numerical  Estimates 
Dihel (2003a) has recently surveyed the empirical literature on the measurement of trade barriers for 
services and the estimation or simulation of the income gains from trade liberalization. Several papers 
from the second half of the 1990s use broad-brush estimates of the tariff equivalents of sectoral pro-
tection from Hoekman (1995); assuming that the ad valorem equivalents of all service import barriers 
are cut by up to one-half, these studies typically estimate the GDP or welfare gains at somewhere be-
tween one-tenth of a percentage point and 2 percentage points of GDP, after allowing for adjustments 
in FDI stocks. Estimates for many developing countries with significant service trade barriers tend to 
be at the higher end of this range; for example, Konan and Maskus (2002) estimate that household in-
come in Tunisia would grow by 5 percent in response to service liberalization, mostly through the im-
pact of additional FDI inflows. When liberalization is limited to particular sectors such as communi-
cation and financial services, the estimated increments in GDP naturally become smaller (Verikios and 
Zhang 2000).  
These estimates are based on fairly highly aggregated simulation models. This raises the question of 
whether the results are borne out by the experiences of developing countries that have liberalized ser-
vice imports, sometimes in conjunction with the privatization of state enterprises under IMF or World 
Bank conditionality. This question is often difficult to answer because, typically, the impact of trade 
liberalization is closely intertwined with that of structural reforms, to the point of being impossible to 
disentangle empirically. Frequently, also the affected sectors involve network monopolies and, hence, 
offer little prospect for enhancing competition  after the reform, which we have previously identified 
as a precondition for the standard income gains from trade liberalization.  
Nevertheless, telecommunications and financial services are examples of sectors that have under-
gone substantial reforms in a large number of developing countries and have often experienced en-
hanced competition as a result, not least because of recent technological advances in mobile telecom-
munications that eliminated land-line monopolies. Fink et al. (2003) analyze the impact of policy re-
form on sectoral performance in basic telecommunications in 86 developing countries in 1985–1999. 
They find that, on average, privatization combined with entry of new providers and the establishment 
of an independent regulatory agency increased teledensity by 8 percent and labor productivity by 21 
percent. Furthermore, simultaneously privatizing the established provider and opening the market pro-
duced better results than sequentially introducing those reforms. While these improvements are sig-
____________________ 
23 Thus the only binding restrictions on subsidies to service suppliers are MFN treatment (unless an exemption has been 
listed) or national treatment (if a specific commitment has been made). This contrasts with much more stringent rules for sub-
sidies affecting trade in goods (SCM Agreement).   27 
nificant in size, privatization and market opening accounted only for a modest portion of the sharp im-
provement in total sector performance that was driven predominantly by technical progress. 
Similar evidence is available for the financial service industry whose crucial contribution to eco-
nomic development, by providing the channels through which savings turn into investment, is now 
widely acknowledged (see Chapter 6 below; Levine 1997). From cross-country regressions, Francois 
and Schuknecht (2000) find that financial sector openness (i.e., the presence of foreign banks in the 
domestic market, not necessarily involving capital account liberalization) is strongly and positively as-
sociated with competition in the sector. Furthermore, competition is strongly associated with economic 
growth, on top of the separate effect of financial sector development on growth (i.e., a highly com-
petitive and highly developed financial sector is associated with a higher GDP growth rate than a less 
competitive and similarly developed sector). Overall, the annual GDP growth rates of countries that 
had fully opened their financial service industries were 1.3 to 1.6 percentage points higher than for 
countries with the “most closed” type of financial service regime. Similarly, Mattoo et al. (2001) find 
from cross-country growth regressions that countries with fully open telecommunications and finan-
cial service sectors grew up to 1.5 percentage points faster annually than other countries. These are 
huge growth effects; for example, with a 1.5 percentage point difference in annual growth rates be-
tween two countries, after 20 years GDP is 35 percent higher in the richer country.24  
Why do simulation models and cross-country growth regressions produce such widely different es-
timates of the income gains from liberalization? Most importantly, simulation models reflect the short-
to-medium-term impact of the particular reforms analyzed; by contrast, the coefficients of service 
sector openness variables in cross-country growth regressions in practice reflect a whole set of closely 
interrelated policy variables. Typically, measures of “good” macroeconomic and structural policies are 
highly correlated across countries. Since most growth regressions are specified parsimoniously, the 
service sector openness variable will often pick up the impact of a whole bundle of growth-promoting 
policies. In this sense, cross-country growth regressions demonstrate the long-term growth effects of 
interrelated institutional and policy reforms, including service sector openness. To improve growth 
performance in line with the coefficient estimates, developing countries would need to adopt a whole 
range of mutually reinforcing policies beyond service sector reform and opening.  
Overall, the empirical evidence discussed in this section reinforces the notions that (i) in many de-
veloping countries, the potential GDP gains from liberalizing service imports to enhance competition 
are considerable, especially compared to further liberalization of merchandise imports; (ii) potential 
benefits are highly country-specific, and sectoral priorities for liberalization need to be established on 
a country-by-country basis.  
6  Economic Effects of Service Import Liberalization: 
Focus on Financial Services 
While cross-country regressions demonstrate the long-term benefits from comprehensive import liber-
alization in key producer services (Section 5.2), such studies offer little guidance regarding the impact 
of particular measures, complementarities between policies, or the appropriate timing and sequencing 
of liberalization. Therefore, to complement the bird’s-eye view offered by these studies, this chapter 
approaches service import liberalization from a sectoral perspective. It focuses on the financial service 
industry, which is widely acknowledged to play an important role in economic development. Sec-
tion 6.1 places the liberalization of financial service imports in the larger context of financial global-
____________________ 
24 The parameter estimates from cross-country growth regressions may be interpreted as indicative of long-run growth ef-
fects. 28 
ization and financial sector liberalization. Section 6.2 reviews detailed empirical studies of the impact 
of foreign bank entry. Section 6.3 discusses selected country experiences with rapid financial sector 
liberalization, including foreign bank entry, in order to assess how the conclusions drawn from this lit-
erature are applicable across a wider range of countries. 
6.1  Foreign Bank Entry, Financial Sector Development, and Financial Globalization: 
The Wider Context  
Liberalizing financial service imports involves, most prominently, removing restrictions on the entry 
and activities of foreign banks. By increasing competition in the domestic market, import liberaliza-
tion thus becomes part of the process of domestic financial sector liberalization. Furthermore, it is also 
closely linked to financial globalization—i.e., the integration of national financial markets. However, 
liberalizing foreign bank entry (which, ideally, establishes national treatment for foreign banks) is not 
tantamount to capital account liberalization, the main vehicle of financial globalization. The presence 
of foreign banks does not prevent the authorities from restricting certain types of capital exports by 
residents or capital imports by nonresidents.25  
To demonstrate the importance of this distinction for policy, it is useful to review briefly the state of 
the debate on whether integration into world financial markets and, by implication, financial global-
ization promote economic growth. Better access to foreign savings could increase incentives for pro-
ductive investment; however, Prasad et al. (2003) find that the productive use of additional foreign 
savings, which would be a precondition for higher growth, depends on whether a country has attained 
threshold levels of human capital development, domestic financial market development, domestic 
governance (encompassing transparency, control of corruption, and rule of law), and macroeconomic 
policy. Furthermore, financial integration is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for rapid 
growth. Some countries with a fairly closed capital account grew rapidly (China and India being nota-
ble examples), while others that were more open to foreign capital flows grew slowly (e.g., Peru and 
Jordan). Econometric tests of the relationship also generally fail to obtain a robust statistical relation 
between financial openness (de jure or de facto) and growth.26 
By contrast, the case for domestic financial liberalization, including foreign bank entry, is more 
straightforward. In the past, policies of financial repression in developing countries—including high 
reserve requirement, interest rate ceilings, and credit rationing—were being justified on the grounds 
that they lowered the interest rate, thereby increased productive investment, and promoted economic 
growth (Denizer et al. 1998: 2). McKinnon (1973) and Shaw (1973) challenged this view arguing that 
“the distortions from financial repression crowd out high-yielding investments, create a preference for 
capital intensive project, discourage saving and thereby reduce both the quality and quantity of in-
vestment in a country” (Denizer et al. 1998). Furthermore, many governments use financial repression, 
not to promote growth, but to obtain “easy money,” mainly to finance government deficits (Fry 1995; 
Denizer et al. 1998). Systematic empirical studies have found a strong positive association between fi-
nancial development and growth, but there is still a debate about whether financial development is a 
cause or a consequence of growth (Goldsmith 1969; King and Levine 1993). Levine (2003a: 72) con-
cludes from a comprehensive review that the econometric evidence “suggests that both financial in-
termediaries and markets matter for growth and that reverse causality alone is not driving this relation-
ship.”27 
____________________ 
25 By contrast, the cross-border supply of banking services (e.g., residents depositing money abroad) does presuppose some 
measure of capital account liberalization (cf. FN 8 of GATS Art. XVI). 
26 Prasad et al. (2003) summarize the results of some 15 econometric studies of which all but 3 found no effect of financial 
openness on growth. See Edison et al. (2002). 
27 There is also an inconclusive debate on the relative suitability of bank-based and market-based financial systems for 
developing countries. Proponents of bank-based systems argue that banks do a better job of acquiring information about firms   29 
There is wide agreement today that there is a proper sequence to financial liberalization. Initially, 
domestic financial institutions and markets should be liberalized, including foreign bank entry, and 
good governance and prudential oversight should be ensured. Only then should countries consider 
opening up the capital account. As the 1997 Asian crisis amply demonstrates, opening the capital ac-
count prematurely may lead to perverse outcomes, including capital flight, less domestic investment 
and lower growth, as well as increased macroeconomic volatility. For many countries, the consider-
able risks from rapid capital account liberalization may well outweigh any benefits in the form of bet-
ter access to international private capital markets. 
6.2  Foreign Bank Entry: Competition, Efficiency, Financial Stability, and Access to 
Credit 
Since a large number of both developed and developing countries have liberalized market entry for 
foreign banks since the 1980s, there is rich data available for systematic empirical studies on how for-
eign entry has affected the incumbent domestic banks as well as the quality and prices of the financial 
services received by customers. Specifically, researchers have focused on the impact on (i) competi-
tion and efficiency; (ii) the stability of the financial system; and (iii) access to credit.  
First, foreign bank entry clearly intensifies competition in the domestic banking market, but does 
that lead to improved efficiency in the banking system as a whole and, in particular, does competition 
from foreign banks force domestic banks to become more efficient? The literature on this issue has fo-
cused mainly on banking markets in developed countries and has found that in developed countries 
foreign banks tend to be less efficient and less profitable than their local competitors. Within the past 
five years, new bank-level data have become available that has allowed researchers to address this 
question for developing countries. Interestingly, they find the opposite relationship—namely that the 
foreign banks tend to be more efficient and profitable than their domestic competitors (Clarke et al. 
2001b). Indeed, it has been suggested that the inefficiency of domestic banks in the host countries is 
one of the attractions for foreign banks entering a new market (Focarelli and Pozzolo 2000). 
Using bank-level data for 80 countries over the period 1988–1995, Claessens et al. (2001) find 
econometric evidence that “foreign bank entry can render national banking markets more competitive, 
and thereby can force domestic banks to start operating more efficiently” (p. 18). In particular, they 
find that the larger the share of foreign banks in the domestic banking market, the lower the profitabil-
ity and the lower the operating costs of domestic banks. Thus, while the removal of restrictions on the 
entry and activities of foreign banks appears to lower the profitability of domestic banks, it does seem 
to improve the functioning of the banking system as a whole, with clear positive implications for bank 
customers and national welfare. 
Another, more recent study (Claessens and Laeven 2003), using bank-level data for 50 countries 
over the period from 1994 to 2001 to estimate a structural model of competitiveness, finds similar re-
sults—“greater foreign bank presence and fewer activity restrictions in the banking sector can make 
for more competitive banking system” (p. 23). However, a more novel finding of this study is that the 
degree of concentration in the banking sector did not, contrary to what is often found, influence the 
competitiveness of the system. They interpret this result in the light of industrial organization theory 
which suggests that contestability, rather than industry structure, is most important for competition. 
This suggests that allowing for foreign bank entry is all the more important in banking systems that are 
highly concentrated, especially when the highly concentrated banks are state-owned. 
____________________ 
and overseeing managers than market-based systems (Stiglitz 1985; Shleifer and Vishny 1997; Allen and Gale 2000). Along 
these lines, Tadesse (2002) finds that market-based systems work better in countries with well-developed financial sectors, 
while bank-based systems do better in countries with underdeveloped financial systems. However, most of the empirical evi-
dence is inconclusive (Demirgüç-Kunt and Levine 2001; Levine 2003b). Perhaps the structure of a financial system is less 
important for its functioning than the legal system upon which it is built (La Porta et al. 1998). 30 
Asian countries, while having experienced rapid financial deepening in the recent years, continue to 
limit, in varying degrees, the penetration of domestic banking markets by foreign firms. However, as 
Claessens and Glaessner (1998: 51) show, the econometric findings based on cross-country data ap-
pear to apply in the Asia region as well. Net interest margins are lower, overhead costs are lower, and 
profits are higher in Asian banking systems that are more open to foreign bank participation. For 
Asian developing countries specifically, a recent study concludes that “the limited openness to date 
has been costly in terms of slower institutional development, greater fragility and higher costs of 
financial services” (Claessens and Glaessner 1998: 31). 
Second, many financial crises in developing countries have been preceded by financial liberaliza-
tion, including the liberalization of restrictions on foreign bank entry (Kaminsky and Reinhart 1999). 
It does not follow, however, that foreign bank entry contributes to the likelihood of a financial crisis in 
liberalizing countries. Indeed, evidence suggests that foreign banks had a stabilizing influence during 
the financial crises in Latin American and Asia in the 1990s. 
A study of bank lending during the financial crises in Mexico and Argentina in the 1990s indicates 
that foreign banks were a stabilizing force (Goldberg et al. 2000). During the financial crises in these 
countries, and immediately thereafter, foreign banks exhibited stronger loan growth and less loan 
volatility than domestic banks, thereby contributing, according to the authors, to greater stability in the 
overall financial system (Goldberg et al. 2000: 23). The evidence from Mexico and Argentina sug-
gests, according to this study, that “diversity in ownership appears to contribute to greater stability in 
times of crisis and domestic financial system weakness.” 
A separate study of bank lending in the East Asian countries that experienced banking crises in the 
late 1990s (Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Thailand) finds that foreign banks took 
little risk relative to other banks in the region in the years leading up to the crisis (Laeven, undated). 
As a result, in the aftermath of the crisis, it was mainly domestic banks, not foreign banks, which had 
to be restructured. Cross-country evidence also indicates that foreign bank presence reduces the likeli-
hood, other things equal, of a banking crisis (Demirgüç-Kunt et al. 1998), perhaps because systems 
that restrict foreign bank entry tend to have lower loan portfolio quality and greater fragility in the fi-
nancial sector (Barth et al. 2004). 
Because foreign banks have more diversified portfolios and greater access to funds through their 
parent companies, they are less exposed to risk and less affected by negative shocks in the host coun-
try. For this reason, Mishkin (2001: 26) suggests that “encouraging entry of foreign banks is thus 
likely to lead to a banking and financial system that is substantially less fragile and far less prone to 
crisis.” Another reason for encouraging foreign bank entry, he suggests, is that foreign bank presence 
encourages the adoption of better risk management techniques by local banks and can induce regula-
tors to demand better risk management techniques in the system as a whole. 
Third, many foreign banks operating in developing countries lend mainly to larger companies, while 
domestic banks are more active in the areas of consumer credit and lending to smaller companies in 
the commercial and industrial sectors (Clarke et al. 2001a: 21). The orientation of foreign banks to-
ward serving larger companies has raised a concern that an increase in foreign bank presence in devel-
oping countries may worsen the access to credit of small and medium-size companies (SMEs).28 This 
outcome would be all the more likely if competitive pressure from foreign bank entry were to crowd 
out smaller domestic banks that are the principal lenders to SMEs in developing countries. This is of 
course an important issue because the expansion of SMEs is critical for labor-abundant developing 
countries that are pursuing an export-oriented industrial strategy. 
It is possible, however, that foreign bank entry could improve the access to credit of SMEs in de-
veloping countries although foreign banks themselves are oriented toward larger borrowers. If foreign 
____________________ 
28 Berger et al. (2000) find that small companies in Argentina are less likely to get credit from large domestic banks or from 
foreign banks than large companies. A similar pattern is found in Chile, Columbia, and Peru (Clarke et al. 2001b).   31 
banks displace domestic bank lending to larger borrowers, the domestic banks may be forced to rely 
more on lending to SMEs. Moreover, if foreign bank entry increases overall competition and improves 
the borrowing terms for all customers, SMEs would likely benefit along with larger enterprises. The 
relationship between foreign bank entry and SME access to credit is, therefore, an empirical issue. 
Empirical evidence on this issue for developing countries has only just begun to emerge. One of the 
first studies on this issue, by Clarke et al. (2001a), uses a survey of over 4,000 enterprises in 38 devel-
oping and transition economies to study the perceptions of borrowers regarding the impact of foreign 
banks on their access to credit and on the terms of borrowing. Their study confirms that foreign bank 
penetration of domestic banking markets in developing countries is perceived by borrowers to have 
improved banking services overall, giving borrowers greater access to credit and better terms (i.e., 
lower interest rates). Furthermore, they find that “the benefits of high levels of foreign bank penetra-
tion do not appear to accrue only to large enterprises” (p. 21). While it appears that larger enterprises 
benefit from foreign bank penetration more than smaller ones, they conclude that “there is strong evi-
dence that even small enterprises benefit in some ways and there is no evidence that they are harmed 
by foreign bank entry.” 
A related study (Beck et al. 2003) using survey data for about 6,000 firms in 74 countries on firms’ 
perceptions of financing obstacles reaches a very similar conclusion. Their results indicate that, in 
general, financing obstacles are greater in countries with more concentrated banking markets, and that 
the effect of market concentration on access to credit is more severe for the smaller firms. The nega-
tive effects on credit access to SMEs are less severe, they find, in countries with well developed finan-
cial institutions, higher levels of financial development, and a larger share of foreign-owned banks. To 
alleviate the negative impact of bank concentration, they recommend policy measures that reduce re-
strictions on banking activities overall and on the entry and activities of foreign banks in particular. 
6.3 Country  Experiences 
This section complements our discussion of econometric studies (Section 6.2 above) by assessing in-
dividual countries’ experiences with more liberal foreign bank entry in the broader context of their 
macroeconomic development. We first describe the challenges faced by Vietnam which was obliged 
under its bilateral trade agreement with the United States to open its banking sector to U.S. banks over 
a three-year period ending in December 2004. While the effects of foreign bank entry are not yet 
known, Vietnam’s current position illustrates the issues faced by many developing countries consid-
ering financial sector liberalization under the GATS. We then turn to Turkey, Colombia, and Argen-
tina, where the effects of foreign bank entry can be observed over a longer period of time, to point out 
the implications for Vietnam and other developing countries. 
Vietnam 
Vietnam is a particularly interesting case because, on the one hand, the financial system in this former 
socialist country is very weak, suffering from a high level of inefficiency nurtured during decades of 
isolation from market discipline and foreign competition. On the other hand, the United States—Viet-
nam Bilateral Trade Agreement (hereafter the BTA) obliges Vietnam to liberalize entry requirements 
for U.S. banks over a relatively short time horizon. Once Vietnam concludes its negotiations on acces-
sion to the WTO, the same conditions will apply to banks domiciled in all WTO member states. If for-
eign bank entry in Vietnam can be managed so as to provide benefits for customers and for the econ-
omy as a whole, this would be an encouraging example for other developing countries with highly re-
pressed financial systems. At the same time, it is important to notice the weak negotiating position of 
countries that seek to join the WTO. As their accession depends on the political good will of incum-
bent WTO members, they typically face far more stringent demands for import liberalization (in ser-32 
vices as in other areas) than many incumbent WTO members would accept for themselves under the 
WTO’s consensus-based decision-making procedure. 
Of course, the BTA extends far beyond the banking sector. Since the agreement went into effect on 
December 10, 2001, the United States has granted Vietnam most-favored nation (MFN) status and na-
tional treatment, unleashing Vietnam’s strong comparative advantage in labor-intensive manufactured 
goods. Total exports to the United States increased by 128 percent and manufactured exports by 500 
percent in the first year of the agreement (2002).29 At the same time, Vietnam has committed to bring-
ing its trade and investment regimes, including but not limited to market access for U.S. banks, more 
closely into line with international best practices, with most transition periods ending at end-2004 (see 
Table 6.2). 
The main concern in Vietnam is that full implementation of the BTA obligations will have deleteri-
ous effects on domestic banks, especially the state-owned commercial banks (SCOBs) with their large 
stock of nonperforming loans. Although little information on the financial health of banks is publicly 
available, it is clear that the four SOCBs account for 75 percent of the assets and liabilities of the 
banking system (Table 6.1). According to one international bank rating agency (Fitch Ratings), Viet-
nam’s SOCBs are “effectively insolvent.” The ratio of SOCBs’ nonperforming loans to total out-
standing loans according to Vietnamese accounting standards is 13 percent, but could be as high as 30 
to 60 percent under international accounting standards.30 According to the IMF, the capital cost of 
provisioning for the SOCBs nonperforming loans is estimated at 7 percent of GDP.31 Most of the 
nonperforming loans of the SOCBs are owed by state-owned enterprises (SOEs), the main client base 
of SOCBs until very recently. SOCBs were also mandated by the government to finance SOE invest-
ments and operating losses, which in the 1990s were large in part due to reform measures intended to 
impose market discipline on the notoriously inefficient SOEs. 
In addition to the 4 SOCBs, the banking system consists of 39 relatively small privately held joint-
stock banks, 4 joint-venture banks, and 25 foreign branch banks.32 As many as 54 joint-stock banks 
were established in the early 1990s, but closures and mergers have reduced the number and are ex-
pected to reduce it even further. The 4 joint-venture banks, all very small and together accounting for 
only three percent of bank loans, are each owned 50 percent by a SOCB and a foreign bank (one each 
from Malaysia, Korea, Taiwan, and Thailand). The 25 foreign branch banks, which together account 
for 15 percent of bank loans, have grown rapidly in recent years despite the restrictions imposed on 
their activities. 
The joint-stock banks (JSB), without the moral hazard of an implicit government-guaranteed bail-
out, have focused their lending activities on private companies, real estate, and domestic consumers 
instead of SOEs. Nonetheless, the joint-stock banks have their own problems, including inadequate 
capital, insufficient scale, and too little banking experience, in particular in risk assessment and man-
agement. Several of the JSBs have, however, been quite successful in developing new banking prod-
ucts, attracting customers, and improving technology. Thus, the outlook, according to the Fitch Rating 
Service, is that “one would expect them (JSBs) to continue growing their share of the market going 
forward.”33 Foreign branch banks, which collectively account for 15 percent of outstanding loans, 
have increased their role in the domestic banking sector despite onerous restrictions on their activities.  
____________________ 
29 See An Assessment of the Economic Impact of the United States-Vietnam Bilateral Trade Agreement (June 2003), the An-
nual Economic Report for 2002 of STAR-Vietnam, a USAID-funded project to assist the government of Vietnam in imple-
menting the BTA. 
30 IMF Country Report No. 01/59, April 2001: 15; FitchRatings, “Country Report: The Vietnam Banking System,” July 10, 
2002: 6. 
31 IMF Country Report No. 01/59, April 2001: 15. 
32 In addition, there are about 42 representative offices of foreign banks, but they are prohibited from offering banking ser-
vices in the domestic market. 
33 FitchRatings, “Country Report: The Vietnam Banking System”, July 10, 2002: 7.   33 
Table 6.1: 
The Banking Sector as of December 2002a (VN dong billions) 









Number of banks  4  76  39  4  25 
Bank capital   18,309  12,618       
Assets   297,072  102,590       
Loans 175,489  55,589       
To SOEs  81,600  7,900       
To Non-SOEs  93,889  47,689       
Share of loans (%)b 70  30  12  3  15 
Liabilities 297,072  102,591       
Dong deposits  124,262  36,993       
Foreign curr. deposits  66,967  26,665       
aIMF unpublished data. — bWorld Bank, Banking Sector Review: Vietnam, 2003. 
Table 6.2: 
Timeline of BTA Commitments to Open the Banking Sector to U.S. Banks 
Effective on December 10, 2001  •  Number of U.S. branch banks no longer subject to a country quota  
•  National treatment for U.S. shares in joint-stock commercial banks 
Phased in from 2001 to 2010  •  Joint ventures allow with U.S. equity between 30 to 49% 
As from December 10, 2002  •  U.S. branch banks are allowed to accept Vietnam dong deposits up 
to 50% of legal paid-in capital 
As from December 10, 2004  •  U.S. branch banks are allowed to take initial mortgage interest in 
land use rights (LURs) held by foreign invested enterprises 
•  U.S. branch banks are allowed to acquire and use mortgages of 
LURs for liquidation in the case of default 
•  U.S. branch banks have access to rediscounting, swap, and forward 
facilities of the State Bank 
•  U.S. branch banks accorded full national treatment 
December 10, 2010  •  100% U.S. subsidiary banks allowed 
Having been prohibited from taking domestic currency (dong) deposits or setting up a network of 
branches, the foreign branch banks have confined their business mainly to trade finance and providing 
banking services to multinational corporations. It is expected, however, that as the restrictions on for-
eign bank operations are eased, they will increase their share of the market and pose a competitive 
challenge to both the SOCBs and joint-stock banks.  
In assessing what Vietnam can learn from other developing countries, it is useful to note that Viet-
nam’s commitments under the BTA are not significantly different from those of other developing 
countries that have recently acceded to the WTO. Nor is Vietnam unique among developing countries 
in terms of the weakness of its financial sector in general and banking system in particular. A policy of 
“financial repression”—interest rate ceilings, policy-based lending, high reserve requirements, and 
other measures that help finance government spending while undermining the efficiency of the bank-
ing system—was (and still is, albeit to lesser extent) commonplace in developing countries. However, 
with the rapid integration of international financial markets and the expansion of the WTO mandate to 
encompass trade in financial services, many developing countries have accelerated financial sector lib-
eralization and opened their banking sectors to foreign competition. We now review briefly the evi-
dence on the impact of foreign bank entry in Turkey, Colombia, and Argentina. 34 
Turkey 
In the wake of a severe macroeconomic crisis, Turkey launched a sweeping financial sector liberaliza-
tion program in 1980 (Onis and Riedel 1993). Until then, Turkey had employed all the elements of fi-
nancial repression in its pursuit of a state-led, import-substitution industrialization strategy—interest 
rates were controlled, reserve requirements were high, and state-directed credit allocation was perva-
sive, accounting for about 75 percent of bank loans. As a result, in the 1960s and 1970s, a large num-
ber of banks exited the market and the system became highly concentrated in the hands of a few pri-
vate and state-owned commercial banks with extensive branch networks.34  
During the 1980’s, financial liberalization in Turkey led to the entry of a significant number of 
banks, both domestic and foreign, with the latter increasing from 4 to 23. Denizer (2000) suggests that 
the entry of foreign banks after 1980 was motivated largely by the expansion of foreign trade conse-
quent on a concurrent liberalization of trade policy. Foreign banks, he argues, perceived a strong com-
parative advantage in trade finance and moved aggressively into the niche of the market. In the Turk-
ish case, foreign bank entry did not lead to a significant increase in the foreign-bank share of assets 
and liabilities in the banking system because the foreign banks specialized in fee-based trade finance, 
corporate finance, and trading in derivatives, leaving much of domestic retail lending market to do-
mestic banks with large branch networks (Denizer 2000: 15). 
Denizer undertakes an econometric analysis of the Turkish banking sector to test the hypothesis that 
foreign bank entry contributes to increasing efficiency as evidenced by lower interest margins and 
overhead costs. He concludes that “foreign bank entry had a strong competitive effect in Turkey de-
spite the fact that the scale of their operations has been small” (Denizer 2000: 19). As in the cross-
country studies, in Turkey increasing penetration by foreign banks led to lower interest margins and 
overhead costs, as well as declining profit margins among domestic banks. Foreign banks also con-
tributed to financial development by inducing better bank management practices among domestic 
banks. After 1980, “Turkish banks imitated foreign banks adopting planning, budgeting and modern 
management information systems” (p.  17). When foreign banks began marketing their services to 
Turkish blue chip companies, local banks were forced to set up their own marketing units. 
Colombia 
For more than 50 years, Colombia allowed foreign banks unfettered access to the domestic banking 
market. This came to an end in 1969 when, in the midst of a macroeconomic crisis, Colombia began to 
close the domestic market to foreign banks and subsequently implemented laws that required existing 
foreign banks to transform themselves into minority joint ventures. A decade later, in the early 1980s, 
Colombia found itself again mired in a financial crisis, which became the motivation for sweeping fi-
nancial sector reform, this time in the direction of liberalization. Beginning in 1985, Colombia began 
to liberalize its financial system, introducing deposit insurance, a loan guarantee fund, and the re-pri-
vatization of banks that had previously been nationalized (Barajas et al. 1999). In 1990, Colombia be-
gan to eliminate restrictions on foreign bank entry and granted national treatment to foreign banks. As 
a result, over the period from 1991 to 1998, foreign banks increased their share of total bank assets 
from 7 to 31 percent, while at the same time state-owned banks’ share of assets fell from 55 to 10 per-
cent in 1998 (Barajas et al. 1999: 13). 
The increase in foreign bank entry after 1990 had many of the beneficial effects on the banking 
system that cross-country studies have found. Barajas et al. (1999) provide econometric evidence that 
foreign bank entry intensified competition in the banking market, with the effect of lower interest 
margins and overhead costs. Interestingly, this study finds that increased entry of domestic banks fol-
lowing the 1990s financial liberalization had even greater impact on competition and efficiency than 
____________________ 
34 The proliferation of branches was a direct result of financial repression, since no other means of competition was permit-
ted in the system.   35 
increased foreign bank entry. Indeed, the entry of new domestic banks after 1990 is shown to have led, 
through increased competition, to increased efficiency among foreign-owned banks in Colombia. The 
only negative impact from increased foreign bank entry in the Colombia case was an observed decline 
in loan quality among domestic banks, which could have been the result of increased competition and 
lower interest margins or the flight of higher-quality borrowers from domestic to foreign banks 
(Barajas et al. 1999: 37). 
Argentina 
After a long period of hyperinflation and financial disintermediation, Argentina, in 1991, pegged its 
currency to the dollar and dramatically reduced its inflation rate. Thereafter, the country experienced a 
rapid growth in financial deepening (e.g., as measured by the ratio of M2 to GDP). Particularly note-
worthy was a period of intense foreign bank entry in the mid-1990s. Clarke et al. (1999) analyze the 
impact of foreign bank entry during this period on the performance of domestic banks. Like most of 
the other studies reviewed here, they find that foreign bank entry intensified competition and improved 
efficiency. However, what is notable about the Argentina case is that the impact of foreign competition 
was confined to those sectors in which foreign banks have a comparative advantage and where they 
focused their lending—in the case of Argentina, mainly in manufacturing and mortgage lending. In ar-
eas where domestic banks have a traditional comparative advantage—for example, retail banking and 
consumer lending—foreign bank entry appeared to have no effect on efficiency. 
Conclusion with respect to the liberalization of foreign bank entry in Vietnam and other developing 
countries 
Many countries that have undertaken aggressive financial liberalization in recent years, including 
opening up the banking sector to foreign competition, started from an unfavorable position of severe 
financial repression. In this respect, Vietnam is by no means unique. Nevertheless, domestic banks 
have, by and large, survived and prospered in the face of increased foreign competition. In our review 
of econometric evidence (Section 6.2) and country experiences we have focused on four issues re-
garding the impact of foreign bank entry: (i) competition and efficiency; (ii) banking sector stability; 
(iii) the allocation of credit across sectors of the economy; and (iv) the development of domestic 
banks. The evidence overwhelmingly suggests that, on balance, foreign bank entry is a positive force 
in regard to each of these issues.  
First, foreign bank entry intensifies competition in the local banking market and provides incentives 
for domestic banks to become more efficient. Although the profitability of domestic banks may suffer 
from increased foreign competition, consumers of banking services and the economy as a whole bene-
fit from greater access to credit and better terms of borrowing. Consistent with the theory of contest-
able markets, this may be true even when foreign banks’ share of the domestic banking market is quite 
small. 
Second, although financial crises were often preceded by financial liberalization, the experiences of 
financial crises in Latin America and East Asia suggest that foreign bank entry has stabilized domestic 
banking. Foreign banks in developing countries have more diversified portfolios and greater access to 
funds around the world through their parent companies; therefore, they are less exposed to risk and 
less affected by crises in the host country. In the Latin American countries that experienced financial 
crises in the 1990s, foreign banks exhibited stronger growth and less volatility in their lending during 
crises and immediately thereafter. In the East Asian financial crisis, foreign banks took less risk lead-
ing up to the crisis and survived the crisis in better shape than their domestic competitors. 
Third, foreign bank entry has tended to improve, or at least has not harmed, the access to credit of 
small and medium-size companies. While foreign banks tend to serve mainly larger borrowers, their 
impact on competition served to improve the access to credit and the terms of borrowing of smaller 
companies.  36 
Fourth, foreign banks in developing countries followed their comparative advantage, concentrating 
their activities in certain banking niches (eg., trade finance and derivatives) and certain branches of the 
economy (manufacturing), leaving domestic banks to expand in the areas of their own comparative 
advantage, namely retail banking, consumer credit, and lending to small and medium-size companies. 
Even in countries that began with fragile and inefficient domestic banking systems, local banks have 
survived and expanded in the face of increased competition from foreign banks. 
Finally, while foreign bank entry is generally beneficial even in countries with weak and fragile 
banking systems, it is only one, and not necessarily the most important, component of financial liber-
alization. It does not relieve governments of the financial burden of restructuring state-owned banks, 
which may be difficult and expensive because of their links with state-owned enterprises. Nor can 
governments afford to ignore the problems of domestic private banks which frequently suffer from 
entry and activity restrictions that undermine their competitiveness and efficiency. What the various 
country experiences show is that liberalizing foreign bank entry rapidly—whether unilaterally under 
pressure from a macroeconomic crisis, under a bilateral agreement like Vietnam, or under the 
GATS—can provide an impetus for a broad-based financial liberalization with multiple benefits. 
7  Prospects for Developing Country Service Exports 
7.1  Modes 1 and 2 
Although developing country service exports have grown considerably since the mid-1990s, their per-
formance has been less than spectacular compared with goods exports; their composition by broad 
categories of services has also changed only little. Data from the IMF’s Balance of Payments Statistics 
(i.e., limited to Modes 1 and 2; i.e. cross-border supply and consumption abroad)) are available only 
from 1995 through 2001 (Table 7.1).35 During this period, developing country service exports grew by 
25 percent whereas goods exports grew by 35 percent.36 As for the composition of service exports, 
transportation accounted for around one-quarter of service export earnings while travel and “other” 
services each contributed a little more than one-third. The latter category includes a wide variety of 
sectors such as communications, construction, insurance, financial, computer and information, royal-
ties and license fees, other business services, personal, cultural, and recreational services. Many of 
these are nontraditional exports that have recently received considerable attention in academic as well 
as policy circles. 
There is little evidence that import barriers constitute a bottleneck for many types of developing 
country service exports under Modes 1 and 2. In maritime transport services, some vestiges of bilat-
eral, intergovernmental cargo-sharing agreements appear to persist but have little impact on market 
outcomes (WTO document S/C/W/62 of 16 November 1998). In travel and tourism, developing coun-
try exports occur mainly  through Mode 2 (consumption  in developing countries by  residents of high- 
____________________ 
35 A more detailed discussion of data availability and trends in service trade is found in Langhammer (2002) and BMZ 
(2003). As regards data quality, it is very likely that balance of payments data underestimate the level of international trade in 
services even under Modes 1 and 2. However, there is no hard evidence (nor even a plausible argument) that the growth rate 
of services is also underestimated. It is not quite clear how service trade under Mode 3 should be measured appropriately; 
services sold by foreign-owned suppliers but produced domestically are conceptually different, for instance, from services 
imported across the border (Mode 1). Furthermore, data on service trade derived from international payments flows relate 
only to “disembodied” services, not to services partly embodied in internationally traded goods where some portion of cus-
toms value reflects the cost of embodied services. 
36 It is worth noting that some goods exports of developing countries, particularly textiles and clothing, benefited from Uru-
guay Round import liberalization in high-income countries during this period.   37 
Table 7.1: 
Service Exports by Developing Countries, 1995 and 2001 
 1995  2001 
All commercial services (U.S.$ bn)  322  402 
Of which (in percent)     
Transportation 26.6  25.5 
Travel 36.6  38.1 
Other commercial services 36.8  36.5 
Memorandum items:    
Developing country goods exports  1,661  2,245 
Industrialized country commercial services exports  854  1,040 
Source: IMF, various issues of Balance of Payments Statistics. 
income countries) and face no significant trade barriers on the part of high-income countries.37 Import 
barriers are also (still) relatively unimportant for many nontraditional service exports that are of par-
ticular interest to developing countries, such as data processing and information technology services, 
as WTO members have so far refrained from levying customs duties on electronic transmissions (e-
commerce moratorium).38  
The modest growth of both traditional and nontraditional service exports by developing countries 
overall contrasts with the high expectations that surround many academic discussions and the public 
debate on this topic. It is useful, therefore, to look more carefully at the experience of one frequently 
mentioned example of a successful service exporter, India (Table 7.2). India’s exports of “other busi-
ness services,” which include information technology and data processing, shot up from U.S.$2.3 bil-
lion as late as 1995 to U.S.$18.6 billion in 2002.39 In absolute terms, the increase was almost as large 
as the increase in goods exports during the same period; thus, services contributed significantly to the 
increase in the ratio of India’s total exports to GDP. The growth of service exports remains remarkable 
even though imports of “other business services” (some of which are probably inputs into the produc-
tion of service exports) also increased sharply at the same time. Why then was India so much more 
successful as a service exporter, specifically in information technology and data processing, than most 
other countries?  
Some clues are provided by OECD (2003b) who analyzes the determinants of developing country 
service exports in a wide variety of sectors, both traditional and other. Most of the discussion, part of 
which is contained in the supporting unpublished working document (TD/TC/WP(2003)23), dwells on 
case studies and other anecdotal evidence because little comprehensive data appears to be available at 
a sufficiently disaggregated level. The paper distills the following lessons from the evidence:  
•  Developing countries are significant players only in a small number of markets, including port and 
shipping services, audiovisual services, construction, health, and data processing. These are mostly 
still low-skilled-labor-intensive services, at least by the standards of high-income countries. Exports 
____________________ 
37 However, some restrictions on FDI in developing country tourism sectors may have the effect of holding back tourism 
development rather than increasing the total value added retained by developing country residents. Similarly, the protection 
of transport-related (e.g., port) services in many developing countries probably represents a substantial barrier to other ex-
ports and unnecessarily drives up import prices. 
38 Certification requirements may represent an effective trade barrier for some developing country service suppliers; for 
example, health care providers in developing countries may find it difficult to collect payments from insurance companies in 
high-income countries. Also, note that the e-commerce moratorium formally expired at the time of the Cancun Ministerial 
and its future now appears somewhat uncertain (see our comments further below on the recent public debate in the United 
States on how the outsourcing of back-office operations impacts skilled employment). 
39 For more detailed information on the sector, see Arora et al. (2001) 38 
at higher skill levels are a recent phenomenon, driven by the much lower wages for high-skilled 
labor in developing vs. high-income economies. 
Table 7.2: 
India: Exports of Commercial Services, 1995–2002 (in U.S.$ billion) 
 1995  2002 
All commercial services  6.8  24.6 
Transportation   1.9  2.5 
Travel   2.6  3.0 
Other services  2.3  19.0 
Insurance   0.2  0.4 
Royalties and license fees   0.0  0.0 
Other business services   2.1  18.6 
Memorandum items:    
Imports of other business services  –2.7  –11.8 
Goods exports  31.2  52.7 
Exports of goods and services (percent share in GDP)  10.4  13.7 
Source: IMF, various issues of Balance of Payments Statistics. 
•  For many nontraditional services, electronic supply across borders and hence access to high-quality 
telecommunications infrastructure are crucial for the competitiveness of developing country service 
providers. 
•  A large domestic market is often a springboard, first, for exports to countries that are geographically 
or culturally close, and then to exports farther afield. 
In the case of India, it appears that several favorable factors have combined to render exports of 
electronic services attractive. Extensive government financing of higher education has helped to pro-
duce a large number of graduates, especially in the natural sciences and mathematics, who are highly 
proficient in the English language. At the same time, the foreign-currency wages of Indian university 
graduates are low even compared to low-to-medium skilled workers in industrialized countries. The 
telecommunications infrastructure in India, at least in the regions where service exports originate, is in 
good working condition while the policy regime for international trade has been liberalized considera-
bly since the 1990s. As a result, Indian companies have become viable exporters of a range of elec-
tronic services from programming to data processing and call center operation, most of which are ex-
pected to benefit from growing world-wide demand for some time yet.40  
It is not clear how many countries can expect (or should even try) to replicate the Indian experience. 
First, in terms of reducing poverty, extensive government subsidies for higher education may not rep-
resent the best possible use of scarce resources; very likely, higher expenditures on primary education 
would be more effective. Second, while electronic services have benefited from increasing global de-
mand, demand for some low-skill-intensive services (where skill intensity is defined relative to the la-
bor force in high-income countries) may well decline due to further technological change; for exam-
ple, improved voice recognition software could render various data processing operations redundant. 
Third, there are simply not many developing countries with English as the main language of commu-
nication, a sufficiently sophisticated physical infrastructure, a workable business environment, and an 
ample supply of university graduates at very low wages. 
____________________ 
40 It is worth noting that up to 60 percent of India’s software exports reportedly still involve onsite input, i.e., Indian 
programmers visiting importers under Mode 4 (Mattoo 2003: 5).   39 
At the same time, the market for outsourced back-office work as well as higher-skilled IT services 
is still growing rapidly. It is therefore likely that many developing country exporters will establish 
themselves in particular market segments, though at a more modest scale than Indian firms. Recent 
anecdotal evidence relates to various electronically transmitted service exports from Ghana, the Phil-
ippines, and China. At the same time, however, developing country service exports will have to grow 
substantially faster than in the recent past to even keep pace with goods exports.  
Export prospects for developing countries will be strongly influenced by the future service import 
regimes of industrial countries. In the United States, a public debate has recently begun on the em-
ployment and wage effects of IT outsourcing, particularly with respect to higher-skilled employees. 
This debate has included calls for protective measures, such as limiting U.S. government contracts to 
firms that perform certain back-office operations in the United States. While it would be premature at 
this point (Spring 2004) to speculate on how this debate will play out in the heat of the U.S. presiden-
tial election campaign until November 2004, it is worth remembering that recently implemented or 
proposed protectionist measures against certain goods imports (e.g., steel, textiles) were largely driven 
by political expediency. Against this background, it is not clear that developing countries are well-ad-
vised to reject negotiations on government procurement during the Doha Development Round, either 
regarding the transparency of government procurement generally (one of the Singapore topics) or 
market access or national treatment issues in government procurement in services specifically (cf. the 
negotiating mandate of GATS Art. XIII). 
On balance, then, developing country service exports are most likely to continue to grow modestly 
along the recent trend. While high-income country import barriers, such as registration and certifica-
tion requirements for health care providers, are probably holding back some developing country ex-
ports, they are not yet a major concern (compared, say, to developing country exports of temperate-
zone agricultural products or textiles). A formal extension of the e-commerce moratorium in the near 
future would provide a welcome signal that the international trading environment for IT services will 
remain open. In any case, the benefits to developing countries from higher service exports under 
Mode 1 or 2 pale in comparison to the potential benefits from significant improvements under Mode 4 
(temporary presence of natural persons; see Section 7.2). High-income countries will find it difficult, 
therefore, to defuse the politically charged issue of improving market access under Mode 4 by offering 
wider access under Modes 1 or 2.  
7.2 Mode  4 
Unfortunately, the GATS definition of Mode 4 service trade is not very specific on what movements 
by people across borders are to be covered. Art. I(2)(d) of the GATS defines Mode 4 as supply “by a 
service supplier of one Member, through presence of natural persons of a Member in the territory of 
any other Member.” The “Marrakesh Annex on movement of natural persons supplying services under 
the Agreement” excludes from the coverage of the GATS “measures affecting natural persons seeking 
access to the employment market of a Member” as well as “measures regarding citizenship, residence 
or employment on a permanent basis.” While this provision precludes the GATS from applying to in-
dividuals seeking dependent employment in another WTO member country at a domestically owned 
company, there is a wide variety of institutional arrangements short of permanent immigration that 
could potentially be covered under Mode 4.  
The negotiating interests of developing and industrial countries differ substantially in this area. In-
dustrial countries seek more flexibility for multinational companies regarding staff deployment around 
the world; such expatriate positions are normally permanent and individual staff remain in a given 
country for several years at a time. Developing countries are interested mainly in enhanced work op-
portunities for their nationals in high-income countries across the whole spectrum from short-term 40 
business visits (which in practice are subject to visa problems in many industrial countries) to work 
opportunities for developing country nationals in industrial countries for periods of up to several years. 
It is worth noting that the concerns of neither industrial nor developing country governments are lim-
ited to service trade in a narrow GATS sense. The deployment of expatriate staff is an important issue 
for multinational companies in any sector of the economy, and similarly the benefits to developing 
countries from enhanced work opportunities in industrial countries do not depend on the sector in 
which their nationals work.  
In principle, the economic effects of “temporary presence” of service suppliers in importing coun-
tries are similar to outright immigration. The effective supply of workers with particular skills (de-
pending on who is admitted) is expanded; hence, their relative wage will decline. At the same time, the 
productivity of other inputs (other categories of workers, physical capital, real estate, etc.) and hence 
their remuneration tend to increase. On balance, the overall income and welfare effect for host country 
residents will normally be positive, unless there are negative external effects or immobile factors of 
production are largely owned by nonresidents.41 However, a strong distributional effect is likely to fall 
on low-to-medium-skilled workers who would be the most likely group to face competition from tem-
porary immigrants (assuming that temporary immigration reaches economically meaningful propor-
tions). Hence the wide-spread political resistance to immigration, temporary (such as under Mode 4) 
or otherwise. 
From the point of view of migrants’ home countries, there is some concern that even temporary mi-
gration may involve a brain drain, especially when education is government-financed. This concern is 
counterbalanced by the insight that very many migrants ultimately return to their home countries and 
benefit from the human capital as well as financial savings accumulated abroad. The main effect, 
therefore, is that individuals from a low-income country are able to earn much higher wages in a high-
income country, increasing residents’ average disposable income.42 Typically, migrants’ remittances 
benefit a relatively large number of individuals through extended family links.  
The existing estimates of income gains to developing countries from permitting even small labor 
movements are huge because the income gains that result from international trade in goods or factor 
services rise with the square of the price differentials in national markets (Rodrik 2002). Whereas the 
remaining price differentials for goods are rarely above 2 to 1, the wages of similarly qualified indi-
viduals in high-income and low-income countries can easily differ by a factor of 10. Rodrik (2002) re-
ports a back-of-the-envelope calculation for a hypothetical visa scheme that would allow revolving 
immigration into high-income countries in the amount of 3 percent of their labor force for 3-to-5-year 
periods. The income gains for developing country residents could easily be in the order of U.S.$200 
billion per year, much more than the estimated income gains from other types of trade liberalization 
(UNDP 1992 had a very similar estimate). Winters et al. (2002) report similarly large income gains 
based on much more elaborate simulations based on the GTAP global computable general equilibrium 
____________________ 
41 In addition, Davis and Weinstein (2002) point out that if the destination country is technologically superior to the mi-
grants’ country of origin, the natives may lose from immigration because their terms of trade deteriorate (intuitively speak-
ing, they have to share the benefits of working under superior technology with the immigrants). In this context, technology is 
defined in relation to a macroeconomic production function and therefore includes such factors as the quality of social insti-
tutions (i.e., anything that allows a country to produce more GDP from a given combination of factor inputs: land, physical 
capital, and labor of various skill levels). Even then, world income will still increase because of the global division of labor is 
enhanced. 
42 This point may be more obvious to noneconomists than to economists who are brought up on a diet of Heckscher–Ohlin–
Samuelson trade theory with its factor price equalization theorem (which, naively stated, says that international trade in 
goods equalizes relative factor prices even without international factor movements). For economists, the point to note is that 
even if physical capital is internationally mobile, other factor endowments, especially human capital, are so unequally dis-
tributed that countries become completely specialized, producing only a subset of goods in which they have a comparative 
advantage. As a consequence, factor prices are not equalized across countries (even though they are less unequal than they 
would be in the absence of international trade). The extremely unequal distribution of human capital may be compounded by 
technological differences (see the previous footnote).   41 
model. The examples of several small countries where favorable cultural and geographic factors com-
bine to permit large-scale labor emigration (legal or otherwise) confirm the potentially large income 
gains. Both in the Philippines and in Moldova, migrant remittances amount to between 10 and 20 per-
cent of GDP. While Philippine nationals constitute a major proportion of the crews of merchant ships 
world-wide, many Moldovans have found access to the Italian and Portuguese labor markets (mostly 
illegally) because their Romanian language permits them to communicate in those countries.  
It must be noted that labor migration as simulated (Rodrik 2002; Winters et al. 2002) or observed 
(Philippines, Moldova) is not limited to the provision of services in accordance with the GATS. Mi-
grants are typically employed in a wide range of low-skill-intensive activities, including in manufac-
turing and agriculture. Therefore, in an ideal world, the GATS with its limited focus on service trade 
(or even the WTO more generally) might not be the most appropriate environment to negotiate and 
implement rules for international migration, temporary or otherwise. Politically, however, the Doha 
Round GATS negotiations on Mode 4 trade appear to offer the best opportunity presently available to 
developing countries to press for more liberal access to industrial country labor markets. Winters et al. 
(2002) and Mattoo and Carzaniga (2003) discuss options for feasible institutional arrangements that 
could become the basis of negotiations.  
8 Conclusions 
8.1  Implications for Developing Countries’ Positions in GATS Negotiations 
This section draws together the implications of the foregoing discussion for developing countries’ po-
sitions in post-Cancun negotiations on trade in services.43 There are two main questions to be an-
swered: First, what liberalization measures should developing countries offer to commit to, in re-
sponse to the requests from trading partners? Second, what measures by high-income countries should 
developing countries push for, given the formers’ initial offers?  
Since 2002, several countries have sent requests for commitments on services to a large number of 
trading partners, including developing countries. Although most such requests are not in the public 
domain, the EU did publish an official summary and all individual EU requests are now available from 
the website of a Canadian NGO (www.polarisinstitute.org). They cover a large number of sectors, in-
cluding some that involve network-based monopolies such as water services (under the heading of en-
vironmental services). As discussed above, developing countries should respond to these requests 
based on their own priorities for liberalizing service imports. As part of this approach, they may wish 
to refrain from making commitments for sectors where their own policies have not yet been defined or 
where import liberalization would not demonstrably enhance competition.  
Regarding market access for developing country service exports to high-income countries, Sec-
tion 7.2 has demonstrated that the main potential source of income gains for developing countries 
would be measures under Mode 4 (temporary presence of natural persons). Unfortunately, the initial 
offers by several large high-income countries, including the United States, the European Union, and 
Japan, are rather restrictive in this regard (WTO documents TN/S/O/[country name]). Proposed com-
mitments tend to be limited to the movement of managers (especially as part of intrafirm transfers) and 
technical specialists. Given the huge potential gains, compared with any other possible “concessions” 
by high-income countries, developing countries may wish to consider a major initiative to start serious 
____________________ 
43 It is reassuring to note that many developing countries are actively involved in shaping the direction of discussions in the 
Council for Trade in Services, judging by their frequent communications to Council members: http://www.wto.org/english/ 
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negotiations on this point. In addition, on a country-by-country and sector-by-sector level, they may be 
able to address critical import barriers that hold back their exports under Modes 1 or 2.  
8.2  Implications for Technical Assistance and Donor Policies 
The potential contribution of technical assistance (TA) and the role of donor policies naturally differ 
across the various policy areas covered by this report. With respect to service imports, liberalization 
will only be successful if it is “owned” by developing country governments and enjoys broad domestic 
political support. This may require the building of coalitions that are strong enough to counter the spe-
cial interests opposed to reform. Technical assistance may be able to support the policy-making proc-
ess through appropriate policy dialog, such as with the dissemination of knowledge on international 
best practices of sectoral regulation, expert-level training, etc. Since in this context “one good example 
is worth more than a thousand words,” it may often be useful to focus the policy dialogue on the re-
form experiences (good or other) of both high-income and developing countries. 
Closer to the definition of specific policies, TA may support capacity building and analytical work 
at the country level to identify priorities for sectoral reform and import liberalization as well as quan-
tify the potential welfare gains and ensuing structural change. Frequently, sectoral reform and import 
liberalization will be closely interdependent and will need to be approached simultaneously, both at 
the analytical level and in the policy-making process. Very often, once a sector has been identified as a 
target for reform, the emphasis will be on devising a comprehensive sectoral policy in conjunction 
with other major donors, such as the World Bank and other development banks. While some develop-
ing countries have the financial resources and expertise to play a leading role in this task, frequently it 
will be helpful to involve international experts in policy formulation, especially with a view to ensur-
ing that the outcome reflects international best practice.  
The actual implementation of sectoral reforms is frequently supported by donor loans or grants, es-
pecially when reforms involve the restructuring of state enterprises. While development banks have 
often taken the lead in providing such loans, there will be opportunities for bilateral cofinancing. One 
area of implementation that frequently requires long-term external support is government regulation of 
newly reformed sectors. The precise format—a competition authority spanning several sectors, an in-
dependent sector-specific authority, direct supervision by the competent ministry—will depend on the 
size of the sector, the country’s level of development, the degree of state capture by private interests, 
the complexity of the regulation, etc. In any case, the success of reforms very often hinges on effective 
post-reform regulation that ensures that monopoly power (e.g., due to networks) is not abused and 
that, where feasible, competition is maintained.  
Regarding potential developing country service exports under Modes 1 and 2 (cross-border supply 
and consumption abroad), TA may help by providing analysis of the development potential of individ-
ual sectors along with the identification of any bottlenecks that are holding back exports, such as high-
income country trade barriers, limited access to crucial inputs at competitive prices, etc. While of lim-
ited importance overall, the elimination of import barriers in high-income countries could have im-
portant sectoral effects, with significant benefits for consumers in high-income countries. For exam-
ple, reforms in health care provision in high-income countries may create incentives for imports from 
developing countries, especially if copayments become more wide-spread and insurance payments are 
fixed per case rather than linked to expenses incurred by the providers.  
As with manufactured exports, export promotion financed by national governments or donors may 
often be justified for promising service sectors: “pioneer exporters” incur significant costs when they 
enter a nontraditional export market, while imitators can build upon the pioneers’ experiences and 
therefore face lower fixed costs of market entry. As a result, exports may not occur in the absence of 
coordination among exporters. In this case, export promotion measures can reduce the costs of market   43 
entry so that instead of the pioneer bearing a large initial cost for the benefit of its imitators, taxpayers 
(or donors) bear the extra cost while economic agents at large (presumably) reap the benefits of higher 
and more diversified exports.  
Finally, with Mode 4 exports (temporary presence of foreign service providers) promising by far the 
largest potential welfare gains for developing countries of all the policy areas discussed in this report, 
any improvements in access for temporary workers from developing countries particularly in high-in-
come countries would be most welcome. While this will obviously represent a substantial political 
challenge for high-income-country governments, the extent to which they meet this challenge will 
widely be seen as a test of their sincerity in promoting open borders, economic growth in developing 
countries, and last but not least progress towards the Millenium Development Goals.  
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